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ABSTRACT 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AS FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR: THE CASE OF 
TÜSİAD 
 
 
Demirkol, Özhan 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Paul Williams 
 
September 2006 
 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the influence of the strong state tradition on Turkish 
entrepreneurs with a special focus on TÜSİAD’s involvement in Turkey-EU 
relations. The thesis traces the reasons of TÜSİAD’s support for Turkey’s EU 
membership. Consequently it analyzes TÜSİAD’s contribution to Turkey-EU 
relations.  
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 Bu çalışma devlet geleneğinin Türk işadamları üzerindeki etkisini, 
TÜSİAD’ın Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerine yaklaşımı  çerçevesinde 
incelemektedir. Çalışma TÜSİAD’ın Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine 
katkılarını ve bu davranışın altında yatan nedenleri ele almaktadır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The relation between the state and the business has attracted the interests of 
many scholars in Political Science and International Relations. Especially with the 
rise of transnational companies as important components of foreign-policy 
making, the focus on the business groups has gained a new dimension. Without a 
doubt, business in general and TNCs in particular have spread their activities 
throughout the globe by benefiting from the advantages provided by the 
technological developments as well as the liberalization of the national economies 
under the guidance of world institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the 
OECD (Axford, 1995: 142.). However, the outcomes of this process for the state’s 
autonomy are disputed by different schools of social science. Held et al (Cited by 
Philips, 2005) defines the dominant approaches in this debate as ‘hyperglobalists, 
skeptics and transformationalists’. According to hyperglobalists, globalization is 
an “inexorable, encompassing and irreversible process of integration which 
heralds the obsolescence of national entities, not only states but also economies, 
societies, systems of regulation, modes of governance and so on” (Philips, 2005: 
91-92).  Hyperglobalists argue that the autonomy of the nation-states in policy 
making is systematically undermined and constrained by the structural power of 
markets and the global capital. Perceiving the rise of global transactions and the 
liberalization of markets as leading to increasing power of the TNCs and other 
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non-state actors at the expense of the nation-states, the hyperglobalists argued that 
the nation-state actors would have limited space in policy making. Indeed they 
argue that globalization dissolves and problematizes the political autonomy and 
the sovereignty of the nation-state especially looses economic autonomy in 
relation to global economy (Keyman, 1999; 23).  Thus, being incapable of 
independent goal formulation; only national governments are under constant 
pressure from other states as well from non-state actors in policy-making.  
Globalization skeptics attack hyperglobalists’ argument from two crucial 
points. Firstly, skeptics argue that globalization is not a new phenomenon. They 
claim the existence of a more liberalized and internationalized world economy 
before 1914 (Philips, 2005: 95). Thus the globalization arguments for these 
authors should be taken as the continuation of the liberalization trend rather than a 
new phenomenon. Secondly, the skeptics are against the so-called dichotomy 
between the national and the global and the convergence hypothesis. Instead, the 
notion of convergence has been challenged by the “myriad manifestations of 
national divergence in state strategies and capabilities, domestic state institutions 
and modes of corporate governance and business systems” (Philips, 2005: 95).  
A third school of globalization on the state autonomy issue argues for an 
intermediate position between the hyperglobalists and the skeptics. 
Transformationalist school accepts globalization as a new and powerful process of 
transformation but it rejects the notion of convergence in the single globe (Philips, 
2005: 95). Moreover, the transformationalist school draws attention to the 
stratification phenomenon, by which some states, societies and communities are 
becoming increasingly enmeshed in the global order while others are becoming 
increasingly marginal.  
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These debates on the effects of the globalization as a process on the autonomy 
of the states are rooted in the debates on the relationship between the state and 
non-state actors that have revolved around first the political scientists and later 
International Relations scholars. In the article Nicola Philips (2005) deals with 
two state debates that counter on the theme of the state’s autonomy from the non-
state actors. Philips describes the first state debate that has turned on state-centric 
Weberian theory and society-centric Liberal and Marxist theories. According to 
the society-centric approaches, the state is an arena that “represents, reflects and is 
inherently constituted by dominant societal interests and social forces” (Philips, 
2005: 85). For liberalism, especially for liberal pluralism, the state is an arena of 
competing interests that are aggregated and arbitrated. The state’s role in liberal 
pluralism is reduced to securing individual rights and freedoms. Thus, liberal 
pluralism neglects the question of the state’s autonomy from the societal pressures 
but argues in favor of the latter’s autonomy vis-a-vis the first. Due to its emphasis 
on the societal actors, Philips notes that liberal theory is called as a theory of 
society rather than state. As Heper (1991: 3) notes, liberal pluralism works with 
the theory of representative government; thus, it neglects the state theory. In this 
sense, pluralism neglects the state phenomenon that has a significant influence 
over the structuration of the interests groups but take state as a ‘helpless victim of 
interest groups unless interest groups hold each other in check’ (Heper, 1991: 4-5).  
Marxist theory shares with liberalism the assumption that the state is an arena 
defined by the interests that it represents (Philips, 2005: 85). According to Axford 
(1995:127), state in Marxist and neo-Marxist theories is treated as an actor whose 
autonomy and performance is subordinated to the interests of the dominant class. 
Thus state does not have an independent existence but is just a mechanism to 
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reproduce class relations in favor of the bourgeoisie. Marxism, like pluralism, 
fails to grant autonomy to state. Moreover, it subordinates political culture to class 
relations and neglect the existence of state culture.  
Besides the nation-states as the dominant actors in the world arena, Axford 
(1995: 2) argues for the existence of a wide variety of non-state actors, such as 
ethnic groups, individuals, voluntary associations, formal organizations, etc, 
whose status has been legitimized during the modernization of Western societies 
and during the spread of Western culture to other parts of the world. The author 
correctly points out the situation as it applies to the western part of the world. 
However, as Buğra (2005: 25) notes, the spread of western values and institutions 
does not automatically accord legitimacy of the non-state actors. Indeed Axford 
falls into the problem that Philips underlines. According to Philips (2005: 83), the 
study of states in IPE has been dominated by empirical focus on the small 
collection of the advanced industrialized states, usually those with liberal 
democratic characteristics. This reliance on the experiences of a small number of 
states to explain the retreat or dominance of nation-states in the international arena 
has led to a range of biases in explaining the cases not involving dominant states.  
The problem mentioned by Philips is evident in the case of Turkey. Turkey 
has been a part of the Western world since the end of the 2nd World War. It has 
participated in Western oriented international organizations such as the IMF, 
OECD, WTO and NATO. Moreover, Turkey has signed the Ankara Agreement 
with the EC, with the ultimate aim of entering the EU. Turkey-EU relations 
developed further by the Customs Union agreement, which granted candidate 
status to Turkey in 1999 and started negotiations in 2005. On the economic side 
liberalization of Turkish economy and promulgation of the Customs Union 
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agreement in 1995 institutionalized interdependency relations between the EU and 
Turkey. However these developments do not mean automatic internationalization 
of western values and the primacy of market economy principles by the national 
elites. Besides, although these developments have brought Turkey’s identity and 
political structure into debate, Turkish politics is still characterized by a situation 
where the state dominates societal actors. In other words, the strong-state culture 
in which the border between the economy and politics is blurred, dominates civil 
society in the case of Turkish politics.  
We should acknowledge the rising importance of civil society in general and 
big business in challenging the state’s dominant role in politics and in foreign 
policy making and underline the structural changes in Turkish economy that have 
contributed to the economic power of big business. However, we also need to 
recognize the difficulties that big business faces in transforming its economic 
power into political influence. Turkey faces structural changes in both the 
economical and political realms with the liberalization of economy, integration of 
Turkish economy into the EU and the rise of civil society. But these structural 
changes do not automatically alter the strong state tradition and the political 
culture based on it. Despite the rise of international transactions of the Turkish 
peak business and their dominant status in the Turkish economy, Turkish 
entrepreneurs are still dependent on the governmental policies in two senses: 
firstly, they are negatively affected by the governments’ populist policies where 
these lead to crises in Turkish economy; and secondly, business activities in 
Turkey are met with suspicion both from the state as well as from the public. In 
this sense, the strict separation between the political and economical realm that is 
assumed by the liberal and Marxist theories does not fit the case of Turkey. 
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Rather, the political realm of the governments in some respects determines the 
parameters of the economic realm in which the private sector operates. Indeed, it 
is the state that has contributed to the economic power of the private sector by 
supplying credits, subsidies, rents and even by populist redistribution policies that 
affects the private sector negatively. 
Change is a complex phenomenon having uncertain results. Turkey has 
witnessed both the transformation of state’s role in economy and the rise of 
international linkages of Turkish peak business. However these transformations 
do not automatically alter state-business relations. Indeed, as Heper (2000: 63) 
notes, continuation rather than change characterizes contemporary Turkish 
politics as well as state-business relations.  Thus, the internationalization of 
economy and the increasing linkages of Turkish business with foreign markets 
and firms do not challenge the traditional domination of Turkish state over the 
private sector. In such a context, internationalization, and the EU in particular, can 
serve as external means to challenge traditional domination of state over the non-
state actors, particularly Turkish business, and to increase the political power of 
big business to the extend that their credibility is guaranteed. In other words, 
international factors can exert pressure over Turkish governments in favor of non-
state actors and can contribute to the power of the private sector in policy-making, 
a thing that Turkish peak business groups have always demanded, as long as 
international factors provide strong stimuli.  
Turkish peak business is represented first and foremost by Turkish 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD). This work will deal 
with state-business relations in the context of Turkey’s EU membership with 
reference to the case of TÜSİAD.  
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In Turkey, commercial and industrial interests are represented by several 
organizations, mainly by TÜSİAD, The Confederation of Artisans’ Associations, 
and Employers’ Associations (TİSK), the Union of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (TOBB) and MÜSIAD1. Despite the existence of a variety of business 
organizations, TÜSİAD has a special place both in Turkish politics and in Turkey-
EU relations.  
TÜSİAD is important due to two facts: it is formed voluntarily, and it 
undermines the national rhetoric that the anti-European coalition uses, in favor of 
the EU-related reform process.  
Firstly, TÜSİAD is an organization that is based on voluntary membership. 
The importance of this fact becomes clear when we consider Turkish state’s heavy 
influence on the formation of entrepreneur associations. That is, in the Turkish 
case, the private sector has been organized around the chambers that have been 
recognized as the only legitimate organizations allowed to represent the interests 
of the sectors for many years. Thus, voluntary associations of the private sector 
have been overlooked. Indeed they were perceived as seeking individual interests 
at the expense of the public interests, which led to the state officers to overlook 
their importance. This resulted in the problem of gaining official legitimacy for 
voluntary associations. Ironically this problem contributed to the formation of 
TÜSİAD: The suspicious attitude of the state towards entrepreneurs that were not 
under the control of state organs such as TOBB made it necessary for the founders 
                                               
1
 Weiker (1981) points out these interests groups except MÜSİAD. However after its 
establishment, MÜSİAD has been an important interest group. Due to this, we found it necessary 
to include MÜSİAD. Despite the ones mentioned above, there are other less influential business 
associations that represent the local interests. For more on these organizations, see (Vorhoff, 
2001). Additionally these groups have formed councils such as the Free Enterprise Council in 
1976. However these organizations could not function effectively due to the conflicts within the 
entrepreneur associations. 
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of TÜSİAD to establish such an organization voluntarily in order to dispel the 
suspicion about independent groups 
TÜSİAD is not the only business association that is formed voluntarily; 
there are voluntary business associations such as TISK and sectoral associations 
such as Association of Textile Industrialists.  However as Vorhoff (2001: 312) 
points out, these associations have limited space for political action. These 
associations have been mostly involved in economic matters or in sectoral 
problems rather than in foreign policy. This increases the political importance of 
TÜSİAD, especially its influence on Turkey’s EU accession bid, as a subject for 
investigation.  
Secondly, TÜSİAD is the most significant organization, capable of countering 
the anti-European demands. EU-related reform process brings the rise of groups 
who are in favor of the status quo or the reform. TÜSİAD as a pro-European 
association has informed the public as well as the national authorities on the 
benefits of the EU membership for Turkey. TÜSİAD has undermined the 
nationalist rhetoric against the EU membership. TÜSİAD has also persuaded the 
European public and the EU political authorities on possible contributions of 
Turkey to the EU.  
We take TÜSİAD as non-governmental organization that is more than the sum 
of its components. In other words, TÜSİAD does not represent the particular 
interests of its members, but the interests of the business corporations, in general. 
This idea is reinforced by the holding structures of TÜSİAD member companies. 
Most of the TÜSİAD member companies are holdings engaged in a broad range 
of economic activities, such as banking, infrastructure investments and industry. 
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Thus, as Bugra (2005; 337) argues, TÜSİAD acts a class organization that 
represents the general interests of the private sector.  
This work will attempt to answer four questions: What are the obstacles on the 
involvement of non-state actors, mainly TÜSİAD in policy-making; in relation to 
this, what are the reasons behind TÜSİAD’s pro-European attitude; and, how has 
TÜSİAD contributed to Turkey’s process of integration with the EU? 
We mainly argue that Turkey’s EU membership for TÜSİAD acts as an 
external anchor that will transform the existing state-business relations in Turkey 
which currently damage the interests of Turkish business by two means: populist 
policies of the Turkish governments that lead to economic crisis; and, unclear 
status of Turkish business in Turkish society. Accordingly, due to the strong state 
tradition, which is inherited from the Ottoman Empire, non-state actors are 
perceived by the national elites as potential threats, which results with heavy 
control of Turkish state over non-state actors. In addition to this, entrepreneurial 
activity in Turkish political culture is not seen as legitimate. These two facts result 
with the fluctuating relations of business and state in Turkey that hinder the social 
position of Turkish business. Moreover, as a result of high costs of being out of 
power, Turkish political parties apply populist policies that lead to economic crisis 
and reward Turkish business as long as the latter supports the governing party. 
The promulgation of the Customs Union agreement and the liberalization of 
Turkish economy do not change this picture. Thus, TÜSİAD as the association of 
the Turkish peak business take the EU as an external anchor to institutionalize 
state-business relations and to sustain economic and political stability. Due to this, 
TÜSİAD pressures both Turkish governments and the EU circles through the use 
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of the EU institutions, publications, advertisement campaigns and direct contacts 
with both Turkish and the EU politicians. 
Paradoxically, it is the strong state that challenges the power of TÜSİAD. In 
other words, although TÜSİAD aims to challenge the state tradition that leads to 
economic instability and prevents the peak business to transform their economic 
power into political one, the strong state tradition, prevents collective action of 
TÜSİAD members and challenges the power of TÜSİAD.  
In order to prove our thesis we will organize the work as followings: 
First chapter will deal with the conceptualization of the strong state tradition 
thesis. Main characteristics of strong state will be defined. It will be argued that 
the absence of intermediary structures and the patrimonial state culture reinforces 
each other. These lead to the absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie. Thus, it was 
the state that created the national bourgeoisie through state intervention in 
economy. However, as a reflection of the patrimonial state understanding, the 
state supported business groups who were loyal to the state. Moreover the state 
exerted heavy control over the associational activity since it perceived the 
business as potential threats that could challenge the order.  
As a result of party-centered politics and the centralization of the economic 
power in the hands of the governing elite, government’s support for business was 
based in the loyalty to the governing party. This ended with patronage politics, 
which left little room for associational activity.  
 Second chapter will deal with the reflections of the strong state tradition on 
Turkish business. As a result of the primacy of collectivity, a value that is 
inherited by the state elite as well as the public, entrepreneurial activity is seen as 
illegitimate. The negative image of the businessmen was reinforced by the rent-
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seeking behavior of the Turkish business. Rent-seeking behavior was a result of 
absence of long-term economic plans, state protection and economic uncertainty 
associated with populist economic policies.  
Another important consequence of strong state tradition on Turkish business is 
the development of informal relations with the politicians. Since interest groups 
have not been institutionalized or cannot reflect the interests, Turkish 
businessmen have developed patronage networks with the governing parties. This 
was reinforced by the populist democracy practices.  
Third chapter will deal with TÜSİAD-state interactions. Firstly general 
characteristics of TÜSİAD will be given. Next, the emphasis will be on the 
economic significance of TÜSİAD. Here, the influence of economic policies on 
TÜSİAD member firms will be given in order to indicate the effects of state 
policies on Turkish business. Finally development of TÜSİAD and state-TÜSİAD 
relations will be given in a historical manner.  
Fourth chapter will deal with TÜSİAD’s pro-European activities. TÜSİAD’s 
perception of globalization, EU and democratization will be given. Next, it will be 
dealt on the contributions of TÜSİAD for Turkey’s accession to the EU.  Finally, 
the deficits of TÜSİAD will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
STRONG STATE TRADITION 
 
 
 
Absence of civil society and interest group politics in Turkey has been 
explained by reference to a strong state tradition that had been inherited from the 
Ottoman Empire and was further consolidated in Turkish Republic. The absence 
of intermediary structures acting to pressure government for the special interests 
of societal groups has led to the rise of the state as an autonomous actor on the 
political scene. This does not neglect the existence of a plurality of societal groups 
such as ayan (land owners) and ashraf (notables: tradesmen and small landowner). 
However these actors did not evolve into intermediary structures in order to 
pressure the state, but to serve agents of the state. Moreover their economic status 
depended on having good relations with the central government. Thus these 
groups could not convert their economic power into political power. Additionally, 
further centralization of administrative and economic structures starting with 19th 
century administrative reforms eliminated the rise of societal groups. This trend 
continued into modern Turkish Republic. Although Turkish history witnessed the 
rise of the private sector, entrepreneurs could not acquire independent political 
power since their economic power continued to be determined by their close ties 
to the state. Indeed this determinacy caused the entrepreneurs to seek personal 
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relations with national elites and resulted in the fragmentation of the private 
sector, eliminating the formation of strong interest groups capable of pressuring 
the government until 1990s, when the EU as an external actor started to influence 
the nature of Turkish domestic politics.  
This chapter will attempt to define the basic characteristics of the strong-state 
tradition. There are four political dimensions of the state tradition in Turkey: 
Absence of intermediary bodies; patrimonial state understanding; primacy of 
collectivity; and, strict control over associational activity. First three factors 
existed together in the Ottoman Empire and reinforced each other. In other words, 
the political culture of the patrimonial state eliminated the rise of the autonomous 
groups but this also contributed to the strengthening the patrimonial culture. These 
resulted with the status of the civil society that is determined and heavy controlled 
by the state.  
Next, the economic dimensions of strong state tradition will ve examined. It 
will be focused on the developmental state and populist practices.  
 
1.1. Absence of Intermediary Bodies 
 
The blurred distinction between the economic and political realms is related 
with the absence of bodies that act independent of the state. Unlike the social 
structure of European states, Ottoman Empire lacked powerful economic groups, 
such as feudal lords, estates and the bourgeoisie developed into autonomous 
structures that could challenge the authority of central governing entity. Rather the 
social structure of the Ottoman Empire was described by İnalcik (Quoted by 
Mardin, 1969: 26) as follows:  
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Ottoman society was divided into two major classes: The first one, 
called askeri, literally the ‘military’, included those to whom the Sultan 
delegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma…. 
The second included the Reaya, comprising all Muslin and non-Muslim 
subjects who paid taxes but had no part in the government. It was a 
fundamental rule of the Empire to exclude its subjects from the privileges 
of the military.  
 
Several factors account for this structure based on the strict division between 
‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’. Mardin (1969: 31) explains the reason for the absence of the 
civil society, composed of social groups that could operate independently of 
central government and based on property rights with reference to patrimonial state 
understanding. As a consequence of patrimonial state understanding, the sultan felt 
obliged to protect the guilds against the merchants. More importantly, by 
centralizing the administrative structure and by denying corporate personality and 
independent authority to towns, the state eliminated the formation of oligarchies of 
merchant capitalists (Mardin, 1969: 27-28). Thus, despite the rise of commercial 
activities in the 19th century, the commercial groups could not evolve into powerful 
economic groups due to the centralization of power as a result of the previously 
formed political culture.  
Özbudun (1988: 2-4) deals with three other features that reinforce the 
distinction between the ruler and the ruled and that eliminate the rise of what 
Özbudun calls as intermediary bodies. The first one is the recruitment (devsirme) 
system in which male children of Christian subjects were reduced to the status of 
slaves and were recruited for service to the state. Thus they were not in a position 
to challenge the authority of the Sultan. Secondly, the land tenure system that 
“vested in the state the original ownership of all the land and limited the rights of 
the sipahi (fief holders) to the collection of taxes and the supervision of peasants 
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under their jurisdiction” prevented the rise of the class of tenants-in-chief as a rival 
force against the Sultan (Özbudun, 1988: 4). Thirdly, unlike its European 
counterparts, the Ottoman Empire did not pursue mercantilist policies by which a 
powerful merchant class that would challenge the central authority could rise. In 
addition to these Heper (1991:13) notes that the ethnic division of labor prevented 
the rise of a powerful merchant class. Non-Muslim minorities, which took the lead 
in mercantile activities, were excluded from the opportunity to turn their economic 
significance to political power, due to the Islamic character of the state and the 
organization of the non-Muslims under the millet system. 
The absence of intermediary bodies does not mean the absence of socio-
economic groups in the society. Rather it means the impossibility of acted outside 
of state restrictions. Thus we can speak of the existence of pluralism among the 
community of the ruled, including religious agencies, nationalities, sects and tribes. 
However this pluralist structure did not result in the autonomy of these groups 
standing between the Askeri and Reaya2. Mardin explains (Cited by Özbudun, 
1988: 31) this with reference to the dominance of ‘status-based’ values rather than 
‘market derived values’. As a result of the bureaucratic nature of the Ottoman 
Empire, political power provided access to material wealth, instead of economic 
power leading to political power. This hindered the rise of economically powerful 
groups as independent political powers despite the increase in their economic 
                                               
2
 Unlike Özbudun, Emre Kongar (2002) takes ayan and ashraf as intermediary bodies. According 
to Kongar, these classes with the role of mediator between the husbandsmen have been the 
economic power behind the war of independence to which a significant part of the centralist power 
will have joined. Kongar correctly points the subversion of the land regime that has increased the 
strength of these intermediate classes. However he does not consider that centralization of the 
administrative power by the 19th century reforms have reinforced the authority of the central 
administration against the intermediate classes. Moreover he also neglects the dependency of the 
ayan for state privileges. Due to this reason, it is not plausible to assume the existence of 
intermediate and autonomous classes.  
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power. Özbudun (1988: 32) notes that “accumulated wealth could not be converted 
into more permanent economic assets because it was liable to confiscation by the 
state”. Thus, although we can witness the powerful economic groups such as the 
ayan and ashraf, these groups did not evolve into interest groups autonomous from 
the state. Rather they acted as state officers. According to Mardin (1969: 36), by 
refusing to allow existing social groups any political autonomy, the state made the 
intermediary structures dependent upon it for support. Tax farming was used as an 
important tool to challenge the autonomy of the ayan. Heper (1991; 14) says that 
the interests of the notables in tax-farming privileges, but not in productive 
enterprise, led to the establishment of vertical links with the state rather than 
horizontal links among themselves. Thus, as in other Middle Eastern states, 
economic life was dependent on the magnanimity of the state.  
Similarly, Heper (1985: 100) treats the absence of a middle-class ethics as a 
result of the absence of intermediary structures. He examines the case in Europe, 
where the rise of the absolute monarchies was followed by the strengthening of the 
entrepreneurial middle class. Heper notes that the state in the Europe helped the 
middle class by such means as mercantilism and then assumed the role of an 
arbitrator and finally became a positive state. However such a dynamic structure 
was absent in the Ottoman Empire. This resulted with the absence of ‘bourgeoisie 
politics’, which contributed to the dominance of the state over civil society. 
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1.2. Patrimonial State 
 
The notion of the strong state implies a doctrinal attachment to the primacy 
of the state (Larrabee&Lesser, 2003: 20). Akarlı (1975:135) says that state, as a 
socio-cultural phenomenon is “an autonomous collectivity of government 
institutions that constitutes a distinct sector of the society”. It is the political 
organization of the collectivity to which primacy is attributed. State is responsible 
for two things: welfare of the subjects and the protection of the order. Therefore, 
any development that could challenge the order as well as state’s dominant 
position is strongly reacted by the state.  
The paternalistic understanding of the state can be seen in the words of the 
leader of TÜSİAD (Cited by Heper, 1985: 103): 
In this country, our philosophy has always been that of taking the “papa 
state” (Devlet Baba) as paramount, refraining from challenging it, and of 
pursuing an economic policy, not in spite of, but with the Papa 
State…Hesitancy on the part of the members of private sector to run for public 
office stems from the belief that the state is influential, and that alienating the 
state would not bode well for them. Let me give you an example. Today in 
Turkey every businessman thinks that even if he has not done anything illegal, 
the state, if it chooses to, may find a pretext and crush him 
 
Heper (1991, 13) explains the primacy of the state by reference to the 
militaristic structure of the Empire. Accordingly, the key role, played in the 
Ottoman Empire, led to the consideration of law and order as a state norm. 
Consequently, the statesmen of the Empire felt themselves under an obligation to 
save the Empire from both internal and external threats, which reinforced hostility 
towards representation of the interests.  
Özbudun (1988: 2) stresses the importance of Islamic culture and its 
emphasis on order. Accordingly, in the Ottoman Empire, the social order was “of 
divine origin and hence immutable”. In other words, legitimacy of the order was 
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not derived from the society but was imposed upon society by the will of God. 
Thus by using the askeri, Sultan was responsible for maintaining the order and 
keeping everyone in their appropriate position.  
The absence of the intermediary bodies constitutes another important point 
that reinforced the autonomy of the state and patrimonial culture. As a 
consequence of the absence of rival locus of power, there has been no room for 
corporate bodies with a relatively autonomous and legally defined status (Köker, 
1995: 54). This resulted in the autonomy of the state. Thus state apparatus is not 
the “captive or handmaiden of any particular social classes but has sufficient 
autonomy from the classes to make decisions that can change, eliminate or create 
class relations” (Özbudun, 1988: 39).  
As Heper (1985: 56) notes, the omnipotent state understanding has 
continued in the Turkish Republic and resulted with the elitist understanding of 
the statesmen. According to Heper, Ataturk had in mind the idea of the Hegelian 
state that would safeguard the general interests without overwhelming civil 
society. Heper (1985: 50) argues that Ataturk believed in the existence of genuine 
feelings and desires that could be ascribed to the nation and a collective 
conscience that would be discovered by the true inkilapcilar (revolutionaries) and 
the halkcilar (populists). The Kemalist elite believed in the capacity of the people, 
but saw that people by themselves would not direct their efforts to this basic aim 
due to their Ottoman past, during which people had been deprived of any capacity 
to take initiative. Thus, people could discover their collective conscience or the 
general interest, as progress to a more civilized way of life took place (Heper, 
1985: 63). Therefore the basic aim of the state was to elevate the people to the 
level of contemporary civilization. It was the state that was obliged to enlighten 
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the masses by imposing modernization reforms from above. In this sense, 
consulting with public opinion meant shaping it, in the eyes of the Kemalist elite. 
As Heper (1985: 51) says, “public policy was not expected to be the outcome of a 
detached aggregation of interests, but the consequence of a search for ‘truth’ and 
‘the one best way’ which was the moral obligation of the educated”. 
Consequently, the Republic for Ataturk was not a regime in which full 
sovereignty was to be exercised by the people but should, at least a part, be 
exercised by non-elected institutions, such as presidency, with the aim of guarding 
the real interests of the people and the ideals of the Republic (Heper, 1985: 59).  
The emphasis of the Kemalist elite in the true interests of the people meant 
excluding ideas that did not fit the republican ideals. As Heper (1985: 62) notes, 
the general will was more than the decision of the community made by voting. 
Therefore public opinion that did not fit the ideals of the Republican elite was not 
considered to be the general will, but only personal interests. This elitist view of 
the general will can be interpreted as the continuation of rulers’ suspicion towards 
particular interests. For the rulers, particular interests had to be subdued to that of 
the general interests. This is evident in the clash between the state elite and the 
political elite in Turkey. By dealing with the case of Germany and France, Heper 
and Çınar (1996: 484-485) define state elite as responsible for the long-term 
interests of the community and accountable to the people as a collectivity, 
whereas the political elites are responsible for representing particular interests and 
are accountable to their disparate constituencies. The authors argue for the 
absence of the accommodation between the state elite and the political elite in 
Turkish case. In order to explain the Turkish case, the authors deal with the 
conflict between the non-elected bureaucracy and the elected Demo
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regime. Accordingly, DP leaders claimed to represent the national will whereas 
the bureaucracy accused of DP for applying populist policies at the expense of the 
‘best interests’ of the country (Heper&Çınar, 1996: 488).  In a similar vein, Cizre 
(1997:156) deals with the relation between the political elite and the state elite and 
says that the hallmarks of the political elite according to the state elite and 
particularly the military were “praetorianism, instability, inefficacy, careerism, 
populism, lack of prudence, corruption and irresponsibility”. This example clearly 
shows the state elite’s negative perception of the representation of the particular 
interests by the political parties. 
 
1.3. Primacy of Collectivity 
 
Turkish political culture ascribes primacy to collectivity over the individual. 
Turan (1988; 96) notes that state, which is “considered as the symbol and the 
means of fulfilling the highest moral aspirations of collectivity”, is the political 
organization of collectivity, and says that: 
(state) is a sacred institution, which is to be protected against the 
arbitrary and capricious challenges of individuals and social groups. Often 
in the high interest of the state or “for reason of state”, is thought to be 
sufficient explanation and justification for governmental or bureaucratic 
action. Citizens, on the other hand, can be convicted for having insulted the 
fictitious personality of the state.  
According to Turan (1988; 96), the primacy of collectivity in Turkish 
political culture has two indicators: The first indicator is the emphasis on group 
solidarity. Consequently, there is lack of tolerance for those who deviate from the 
group. Thus, individuality and deviance from group norms were punished; 
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conformity to these norms was rewarded by the bureaucratic agencies, political 
parties and even by the voluntary associations (Özbudun, 1988: 34). 
The second indicator of the primacy of collectivity is the rejection of class-
based politics and class struggles. The emphasis on the rejection of class conflicts 
and the particularistic outlook of classes has continued under the Turkish Republic. 
As Özbudun (1988; 33) notes, Kemalist notion of populism rejected class conflicts 
and favored the harmony of interests through paternalistic policies. This prevented 
the institutionalization of a legitimate opposition at the cultural level. Thus, as 
Özbudun claims, the distinction between legitimate political opposition and treason 
is blurred. Indeed, opposition is perceived as a danger to the unity of the nation. 
 
1.4. Developmental State 
 
The economic dimension of the strong-state tradition is related to the 
patrimonial state understanding. State, as the ‘father of its subjects’, aims to 
protect the social order and the well-being of its subjects. In the Ottoman case, 
Sultan had duty of hisba, which means that the ruler was responsible for the well-
being of the subjects (Heper, 2000: 65). Thus the state elites, which perceived 
development as the step for the well-being of the think of the society, gave 
priority to the goal of development.  
In the late 19th century, development was considered as the key for the 
protection of the Empire and the order. Traditionally, the Ottoman ruling elite 
equated industrialization with development, which was the cure for the problems 
of the empire. However the distribution of the economic power on the basis of 
millet system and the concentration of the economic activities in the hands of the 
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non-Muslim minorities that had close relations with European counterparts led to 
the importance of the creation of the Muslim industrialists in the eyes of the ruling 
elite. Therefore, the problem for the Ottoman rulers was not just a creation of the 
industrialists but also the creation of the Muslim industrialists in particular and 
Muslim entrepreneurs in general. Disturbed by the economic dominance of the 
non-Muslims, both the politicians and the intellectuals aimed to develop a Muslim 
entrepreneur class3. Thus, in 1913 law for encoding the industry was enacted and 
in force until 1927 (Buğra, 2005: 67)4.  
The idea of the developmental state with emphasis on the industrialization and 
the creation of Turkish entrepreneurs continued into the first years of Turkish 
Republic. This time the reason for the emphasis in the industrialization was to 
reach to the level of contemporary civilizations. Kemalist elite perceived the state 
as ‘the agent of modernization’ (Kaya, 2004: 82). It sought to establish an 
industrial base so that the new republic would not face the dilemmas of the ex-
regime. Nevertheless the emphasis on the creation of national bourgeoisie on the 
basis of active state support for private accumulation continued (Kaya, 2004: 89). 
The private sector benefited from lack of competition with the non-Muslim 
counterparts, due to the exchange of the population with Greece and the expulsion 
of the Armenians. Moreover state continued to help the private sector with the law 
for encouraging industry. On the other hand, the decisions of the Congress of 
Economy of Izmir on the encouragement of private initiative created the 
                                               
3
 Unlike the Western states in which the law is the ‘protector of the property’, Law in Ottoman-
Turkish states is the ‘creator of property’. This gives the state right to transfer the property to those 
that have good relations with the state and that support the governing parties. In this sense, ‘right 
of property’ does not have strong bases. (Akalın, 2002: 58) 
4
 Industrial Encouragement Law was renewed in 1927. This law affected firms that employed 
more than 750 man-days of labor per year. Government granted these firms free land up to ten 
hectares. These firms were to be exempted from taxes on land and immovable property and 
profits, and import duties on machinery and construction materials, which were not domestically 
produced. (Hale, 1981: 43) 
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necessary environment for the development of the industrialists in Turkey. 
However Turkish experience shows that rapid industrialization by the hands of 
private sector did not take place as expected. This resulted in the application of 
the statist policies in 1930s.   
The reason for the direct involvement of the state in economy in the form of 
SEEs (State Economic Enterprises) can be explained according to the “late 
industrialization” problem. As Buğra (2005: 34) asserts, late industrialization has 
been a fundamental problem in Turkey, both for state-business relations and for 
economic development. The author uses the term ‘late industrialization’ in order 
to define states in which industrialization has developed without the local capacity 
to develop technology. In such states it is impossible for small firms to develop 
into larger ones due to the lack of entrepreneurial qualities of the businessmen and 
due to the lack of the capital for the transfer of the technology. Thus state 
involvement becomes necessary (Buğra, 2005: 35). In a similar vein, Vorhoff 
(2001: 312) points out the consequences of the late industrialization in Turkey, 
namely heavy state involvement in economy and creation of the national private 
sector. According to the author, the Kemalist mission to reach the level of 
contemporary civilizations had assumed industrialization and economic 
development as top priorities. Thus the industrialization that the private sector 
could not maintain was planned to be done by the etatist policies and by the 
formation of public enterprises.  
Etatism reflects the pragmatic stance of the state elite5. It is not an ideology; 
but is the attempt of the state to realize the priorities (Hale, 1981: 55). It never 
                                               
5
 Hale (1981: 50) notes that private capital and entrepreneurial skills were short in supply; fiscal 
and other forms of support for industry did not result with industrial investment. Thus RPP aimed 
to force industrialization through state enterprises  
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attempted to replace the private sector, but aimed to substitute for the private 
sector. Thus, by etatism, state did not threaten the private sectors’ position, but 
aimed to strengthen it. As İlkin (1993: 188) notes, the etatist policies provided 
Turkish private sector with considerable commercial capital. The state, as Vehbi 
Koç (Cited by İlkin, 1993: 187) notes, had been the primary buyer that obtained 
“contracting business and turned it over to the private sector”.   
Although etatism aimed to create a national industrialist class, the state could 
not encourage industrialization in private sector. It was in 1950s when a national 
industrialist class began to emerge. İlkin (1993: 189) argues that the main reason 
for this change in the attitudes of Turkish private sector was related to the 
implementation of an import-substitution policy as an attempt to solve the 
problem of shortages of exchange. Except 1950-53 and 1970-73 periods, during 
which foreign-trade liberalization attempts were applied, Turkey, until 1980, 
applied import-substitution industrialization policy (Şenses, 1994: 52).  Öncü 
(1980: 468) summarizes the ISI (Import-Substitution Industry) model as follows: 
1. Heavy reliance on foreign loans and credit to finance industrial 
investment 
2. Introduction of customs duty and charges concessions; fiscal favors 
such as tax rebates, etc., to import-substituting industries 
3. Introduction of tariffs and quotas to reduce competition from imports 
4. To meet the demands of the assembling industry and industry 
depending on imported raw materials, an increasingly large percent of 
available means of imports being allocated to raw materials 
 
Through use of cheap credits, protectionism, and state intervention in 
infrastructure, it was expected that dependence on foreign countries would 
decrease (Gülfidan, 1993: 46). Thus, in order to protect Turkish infant domestic 
industry, tariffs and quotas were put on import.  
ISI model had certainly encouraged Turkish businessmen to invest in industry. 
In 1963, private sector had the share of 55.8% in total production of 
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manufacturing industry; in 1976 this increased to 64. 9 %( Gülfidan, 1993: 47). 
Moreover, 55% of TÜSİAD member firms were incorporated during this period.  
Another factor that indirectly affected industrialization was the increasing 
economic power of the private sector as a result of the 2nd World War. The War 
created opportunities for the urban commerce and the local notables that have 
acted as intermediaries between the national market and the peasants. The 
commercial sector gained huge profits from imports due to the unavailability of the 
imported goods. On the others side, notables increased their well-being by buying 
products at moderate, but selling them at high, prices (Turan, 1988: 70). This 
resulted in the rise of the middle class in Turkey as well as the increase of the 
capital of the private sector.  
Turkish businessmen also made use of the DP policies that carried certain 
characteristics of liberal economic policies (Elder, 2004: 54). . Firstly, the DP 
regime adopted a liberal outlook in foreign trade.  DP regime has also been 
supportive of the development of a private sector. The DP regime sought to 
provide rapid industrialization through industrial and infrastructural investments6. 
DP governments benefited from the Cold War atmosphere to gain use the external 
sources of funding investments and the incentives for industrialists and the 
agricultural sector. 
Final factor that encouraged industrial investment is the confrontation with the 
West during the DP period as a result of the Cold War atmosphere İlkin (1993: 
185) notes that “DP’s ascent to power in 1950 which gave high priority to 
private enterprises, the acceleration of foreign capital investments, the Western 
                                               
6
 Although DP government proposed for the privatization of SEEs other than those that engaged’ 
solely in fields related to basic industries and having a public service character’, Turkish firms 
were reluctant to privatization. Hale (1981: 89) explains this reluctance according to the Turkish 
businessmen’s tendency to “invest their capital in something which they could personally control”.  
 26 
 
education of a great number of students, and the establishment of academic 
institutions which provided Western-type education in Turkey created favorable 
conditions for Turkish business in encountering with the foreign firms. 
The main development that shifted Turkish firms from commerce to 
industrial activities during 1950s was the establishment of Türkiye Sınai 
Kalkınma Bankası (Industrial Development Bank of Turkey) under the auspices 
of World Bank. The aim of TSKB was to support, enlarge and establish private 
industrial enterprises, and to help Turkish enterprises and foreign firms to 
participate in Turkish industry (Sönmez, 1990: 71-72). Main portion of TSKB’s 
resources came from World Bank and the Marshall aid.  
TSKB has important contribution for the establishment of Turkish private 
industry sector. In their memories, TÜSİAD founders such as Nejat Eczacıbaşı 
(1982) and Sakıp Sabancı (1985) deal with the importance of credits lend by 
TSKB for establishing industrial bases. 
Before 1950, Turkish firms acted as the distributor of the foreign firms and 
were more commerce-oriented. However, starting with 1950s and especially in 
1960s, Turkish private sector has established joint ventures with the foreign 
firms. Some Turkish firms who assembled the imported parts for the 
construction of radios, refrigerators, etc, were directly dependent on foreign 
sources; some firms formed joint-ventures where Turkish firms provided 
capital while foreign firms brought “in the patent and most of the machinery 
parts and some managerial and engineering skills” (İlkin, 1974: 493).  
Production for Turkish market was attractive for both Turkish firms and 
foreign firms due to the cheap credits, cheap foreign exchange, state supports 
and the protection of Turkish market (Sonmez, 1990: 67; Sunar, 1974: 493). 
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This encouraged formation of joint-ventures. However this also ended with the 
increasing dependence of Turkish industry to foreign firms for technology and 
skills, and to the state for supplying foreign exchange in order to obtain 
necessary inputs.  
 
1.5. Regulator State 
National elite’s emphasis on the development of national businessmen does 
not mean that the suspicion towards the non-state actors decreased. While 
sustaining development; the state elites saw it necessary to keep everyone in its 
appropriate position. Although the state aimed at the creation of a private sector 
under the guidance of the state, it was also suspicious of this rising group. Turan 
(1988: 70) explains the suspicion according to the Ottoman heritage and says that: 
 
Turkish understanding of statecraft inherited from the Ottomans, not 
only gave the state the responsibility for providing for the welfare of the 
citizens and maintaining a balance between social groups, but also viewed 
with suspicion the growth of any socio-economic groups which could 
challenge the political domination of society by a centrally located 
bureaucratic elite. Economic change seemed to upset the equilibrium 
between social groups, and to produce a class, which could compete with 
the centralist elites for the domination of society. 
 
This suspicious attitude of state towards the businessmen was evident in the 
case of capital tax. Rather than punishing the speculators that have benefited from 
the War conditions, RPP government preferred to punish all businessmen, whether 
speculator or not (Buğra, 2005: 166). The suspicion of the emerging economic 
groups, coupled with the role of central government as welfare provider and the 
burden of supporting the mobilized army through the War, resulted in two 
measures: capital tax, especially on non-Muslims, and the compulsory sale of a 
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part of agricultural production to the state below market prices (Turan, 1988: 40)7. 
This was a clear sign of the central government’s capacity to threaten the interests 
of the private sector by using the instruments of state (Waldner, 1999: 57-59).  
Despite the fact that statesmen have considered private sector as important for 
development, the state did not establish organic links with societal actors but 
acted by extending itself into the business sector (Heper, 1991: 14). That is, the 
state perceived societal actors as rival powers that should be kept under close 
guidance of the state. It did not oppose development of private sector, but reacted 
the interference of business to the political realm In order to maintain the 
regulation, interest group associations were organized into chambers in the mid 
19th century. 
Chambers as professional organizations, acted like consultative bodies of 
the government in economic affairs. They are used as the instruments of the state 
to control the private sector. They have the status of kamu kurumu niteliğindeki 
meslek kuruluşları (business organizations with the status of public organizations) 
to which the state has transferred the right to control the profession groups.  They 
act as semi-official organizations in which membership is compulsory. Thus in 
order to enter the economy, the permission of the chamber is needed. Moreover 
chambers have the right to force firms to behave ethically, even to prevent their 
economic activities. They are responsible for representation of the private 
interests as well as maintaining the public benefit. (Öncü, 1983: 1566) Thus 
chambers are means though which state expanded its control to the economy by 
replacing the traditional guilds with the chambers (Heper, 1991: 15).  
                                               
7
 Hale (1981: 60-61) notes that these measures, although not fully implemented, felt the private 
business to be threatened by the government. Thus, private sector, after the transition to multiparty 
regime, found DP economic policy more convincing, although RPP and DP economic policies 
were similar.  
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 The organization scheme of the chambers reflects the state’s suspicion 
towards private interests. Chambers are organized locally. In other words, 
interests of the local entrepreneurs are reflected in the national assembly of the 
chambers. Additionally, chambers represent the interests of two groups: those of 
the commerce and the industry. In fact, in most of the cities both commercial and 
industrial interests are represented by the same chamber. With the introduction of 
the 1950 law on chambers, establishment of the industrial chambers was 
permitted. Despite this permission, chambers still have the problem of under-
representation of various branches of commerce and industry. This indicates that 
the state wants to avoid particularistic interests of certain sectors but treats the 
industry as a whole. 
Laws on chambers reflect the idealist stance of the state to create national 
entrepreneurs as well as the state’s suspicion towards the autonomous locus of 
power. For example, in 1971, the authority of the chambers to allocate foreign 
currency quotas, which had central importance for Turkish businessmen, was 
withdrawn and was granted to the Ministry of Commerce (Öncü, 1980: 469). This 
is a sign of the central authority’s suspicion towards the autonomous powers so 
that it resulted with the centralization of this authority.  
Apart from the chambers, the legal framework was a means to control 
business activity, especially formation of business associations. However the state 
did not have a permanent attitude towards the associational activities. As Bianchi 
(1984: 107) notes, “at times, the state encouraged associational organization so 
that it could more clearly represent conflicting interests within a changing social 
structure; at other times the state has sought to contain or prevent interest conflict 
and restructure society to match elite visions for the future”.  
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State policy towards the associational is characterized by fluctuations in 
which promotion of associational activity is followed by limitations (Bianchi, 
1984: 109). Hazama (1999: 71-81) characterizes the control of state over the 
associational activities with periods alternating between regulation and de-
regulation. He deals three waves of regulation and three waves of de-regulation. 
Except for de-regulation of 1995 in order to facilitate the approval of the Customs 
Union by the European Parliament, all the amendments to laws on associations 
were enacted by the government without consulting societal actors8.  
The first law of association was enacted in 1938 by the RPP regime. 
Although the restrictions on oppositional activities started after the 1925 Seyh 
Said rebellion, the status of associations was ‘institutionalized’ by the 1938 law 
on associations. According to the law, associations’ establishment was based on 
the permission of the Ministry of Interior. Associations were allowed to have 
single purpose and were prohibited from engaging in political activity (Hazama, 
1999:73).  
After the decrease in support to RPP regime in the 1946 election and the 
rise of DP as the opposition party, RPP leaders were under pressure of the DP 
group to remove the restrictions on associational activities (Hazama, 1999:74). 
Thus RPP government amended the 1938 laws in order to remove the restrictions. 
By the amendment, associations were not required to get the permission of the 
Ministry of Interior. More importantly, the restriction on formation of associations 
based on class was removed, which allowed the employees to form trade unions. 
                                               
8
 After 1960 military intervention, a constituent assembly composed of military and civilian 
houses was formed in order to prepare the 1961 constitution. However participation to the 
constituent assembly was conditioned on the absence of relations with DP regime. Thus, Ankara 
Chamber of Commerce that had supported DP leaders against the intervention was banned by the 
Revolution Committee. (Buğra, 2005: 190).  
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However due to the increase in the number of trade unions and socialist parties, 
RPP leaders came to the notion that “they went too far by recognizing class-based 
political parties” (Quoted by Hamaza, 1999:75). This resulted in the 1947 law of 
trade unions and Employers’ union, which banned class-based unions and 
socialist parties. Next, in 1952, the DP government amended the 1946 law on 
association to reinforce the control of associations. The amended law was used by 
the DP leaders to suppress opposition groups and to change trade unions into DP 
supportive organizations, and to “reward its supporters and harass its opponents” 
(Hazama, 1999:75; Bianchi, 1984: 115)9.  
1960 constitution was regarded as the most democratic marking a shift to a 
pluralist society and democracy based on the supremacy of constitution and 
checks and balances (Hazama, 1999:76; Özbudun, 1991: 41). By the new 
constitution, permission for formation of association was not required and 
associations could be restricted only for the protection of law and order. However, 
after the rise of the leftist activities in late 1960s, the 1972 law of associations 
gave the Ministry of Interior the power to supervise and regulate associations 
(Hazama, 1999:79; Bianchi, 1984: 117). Finally, according to the 1983 law of 
associations, restrictions on associations were strengthened (Özbudun, 1991: 42). 
The 1983 law prohibited political activities by associations and prohibited 
associations based on religion, class, race, region or sect. It also increased the 
regulatory power of the Ministry of Interior. Moreover tax reductions and 
exemptions were only applied to a limited number of ‘preferential associations’ or 
‘public beneficial associations’ (Hazama, 1999:67). In order to be recognized, the 
                                               
9Bianchi (1984: 193) notes that the laws on associational activities were constantly violated, even 
by the governing parties, and were selectively enforced, especially when the governing party feels 
that the association became too close to the opposition. This contributed to the fluctuations in 
business-state relations.  
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law requires that the activities of the association should benefit the state as a 
whole and should obtain the approval of various state organs, mostly of the 
Ministry of Interior (Hazama, 1999:68). Thus, during the post-1982 period, the 
development of interest groups into pressure groups was inhibited (Kalaycioglu, 
1991: 80).  
 
1.6. Populism and Distributor State 
 
Populism is one of the deficits of Turkish economy that leads to 
macroeconomic instability. Populism can be defined with reference to two 
characteristics (Elder, 2004: 52): top-down mobilization that circumvents all 
institutional channels between the state and civil society; and, significant change 
of the coalitional profile of which societal groups are mobilized. 
Populism in Turkish case refers to the attempt to sustain a broad- based 
coalition. As referred before, in Turkish political culture, the state acted as the 
father of the subject and aimed to protect the order. Unlike the European 
counterparts in which, the state was the instrument of some sectors of the society, 
state in the cases of modern Turkey, was autonomous from the interests of the 
societal groups. Additionally both of the states had made the private sector 
dependent on state’s support for economic gains. In this sense in both cases, the 
private sector’s power was dependent on the generosity of the state. Although 
both states aimed to create an indigenous bourgeoisie, their support for the national 
firms dependent on the latter’s obedience to the state’s authority. In this sense, the 
state acted as distributor; distribution was based on the obedience to the central 
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authority in general and the government in particular. Thus despite the rising 
economic power of the private sector, the entrepreneurs had to develop good 
relations with the state. Heper (1985: 101) explains this with the following words: 
While in the West the burghers developed into self-made capitalists, 
the economic middle strata in Ottoman-Turkish society lived on the 
margins of the polity. Later they emerged as a state-made group. As such, 
they always remained weak in terms of capital, and were dependent upon 
the state 
Our emphasis on the concept of strong state does not imply that the 
governments are always autonomous from the pressure of social classes. It implies 
the fact that the representation of interests of different classes is not well-
institutionalized. Moreover it implies that the state is not as an actor whose 
autonomy and performance is subordinated to the interests of the dominant class. 
Therefore, as Öniş (1992: 4) states, “highly centralized ‘patrimonial states’ that 
enjoy significant coercive powers plus a high degree of concentration in the policy 
making process can, at the same time, be extremely weak and vulnerable in a 
number of key policy areas”. In this sense, strong exist can coexist with weak 
governments that have to sustain broad-based coalitions. The weakness of the state 
is brought by the transition to multiparty system in Turkish case.  
Transition to a multiparty regime in 1946 had an important consequence for 
Turkish politics. Bianchi (1984: 35) says that structural changes and the liberal 
democracy that came after the 2nd World War provided an environment in which 
political participation became oriented towards the protection and advancement of 
conflicting interests. Thus, as Turan (1988: 82) asserts, the end of RPP’s regime by 
the votes of citizens led the citizens to become conscious of their power to change 
the government. More specifically, the voters gained confidence that the 
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government had to obtain their consent in order to retain in power. This resulted in 
the increasing importance of the distributive functions of the government in the 
eyes of both the politicians and the voters.  
In an order, which is characterized by the centralization of resources and 
absence of intermediary structures with sufficient economic power, political parties 
sought to remain in power. Özbudun (1988: 40) notes that the autonomy of the 
state as the result of the absence of intermediary structures brings high costs to 
being out of power, and says: 
because of the high degree of government centralization and the 
large role of the Turkish state in the economy, “those in the government” 
have access, directly or indirectly, to an immense amount of resources in 
relation to the resource base of society, which they can distribute. 
Conversely, a party is that out of power tends to get weakened since it does 
not have access to political patronage resources.  
 Thus, because of the high costs of being out of power, parties are 
vulnerable to the preferences of the voters. Therefore political parties have 
developed instruments in order to attract voters who had realized their capacity to 
change the government. In fact, political parties are the networks by which public 
patronage is distributed (Turan, 1988: 105). Consequently, voters have become 
more interested in Turkish politics and have started to identify themselves more 
closely with political parties (Turan, 1988: 82). Turan (1988: 104) says that: 
  The central political and economic location of the state in Turkish 
society means that those in government have access, directly or indirectly, 
to an immense amount of resources in relation to the resource base of the 
society, which they can distribute. But because the resource base of society 
is modest, receiving resources from the government of failure to receive 
them affects closely the fortunes of many. This creates a tendency in parties 
to get into power no matter how, backed by constituents who stand to lose a 
lot if their party fails. Ironically, this also means that supporters are prone to 
defection rather easily if their party fails to get into government. 
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 As a consequence of the consciousness of the voters and the costs of being 
out of government, political parties attempted to attract the votes of all segments of 
the society. The most prominent example to populist policies has been that of DP 
period. DP won the 1950 elections by constructing a center-right coalition that 
embraced “private businessmen, large and medium-sized rural producers, and 
workers, predominantly from the public sector” (Waldner, 1999: 60). During the 
period between 1950 and 1960, DP tried to mobilize people for support of the 
party in a populist fashion (Heper, 1985: 100; Elder, 2004: 54-55). Heper (1985: 
100-101) calls DP polity as “party-centered polity”, which is “an apolitical party 
system that is autonomous from social groups as a consequence of the absence of 
the intermediary bodies”. This party-based nature of democratic regime resulted in 
populism with a “corresponding bias towards fiscal impudence and 
macroeconomic instability” (Öniş, 1992: 8).  
An important consequence of DP policies to sustain a broad based coalition 
was the rise in inflation. Öniş (1992: 6) states that, governments, with the need to 
generate popular support, relax fiscal discipline, which results with 
macroeconomic instability. This was the situation for the DP regime. DP, with the 
aim to win votes attempted to provide rapid development through industrial and 
infrastructural investments and to increase the well-being of the agricultural sector 
resulted in economic crises (Turan, 1988; 76-77; Hale, 1981: 92; Elder, 2004: 55). 
The funds needed to finance theses efforts could be maintained by external 
borrowing. However towards the end of 1950s, there was a decrease in external aid 
and credits. Moreover, domestic borrowing was not a solution since the level of 
domestic savings was low. DP leaders were disinclined to impose new taxes since 
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this would lead to a decrease of electoral support. Thus the only way to finance the 
economic policies in order to protect the broad-based DP coalition was to increase 
the supply of money by printing currency. This ended in the increasing rate of 
inflation.  
Özbudun (1988: 18) explains the authoritarian tendencies of DP regime by 
reference to two factors. Firstly DP leaders were socialized under RPP rule, so they 
inherited many attitudes that were favorable to single party rule. Second reason 
was the Ottoman-Turkish cultural legacy of lack of tolerance for opposition. As a 
result, political opposition was perceived as dangerous and there was little space 
for a legitimate opposition. Thus DP attempted to create a general movement 
against the government when the party was in opposition and against the 
opposition when it was in power. (Heper, 1985: 105) Similarly, Turan (1988: 74-
75) argues that DP leaders inherited the Ottoman political culture, which had been 
transmitted to the RPP regime. Additionally, Turan points out two further reasons 
that explain the failure of the democratic experience under DP regime. Firstly, DP 
leaders seemed to feel that being in government meant unrestricted use of political 
power. As a consequence of this, opposition could exist only as long as the 
government would allow it. Affected by the Ottoman legacy, DP lacked tolerance 
towards its opponents. Secondly, DP also inherited the idea that state organs could 
be utilized by the ruling party for the advancement of its partisan interests. Thus 
the confusion of state and the party continued in the DP era. Indeed resources 
available to the government were allocated by the DP regime to those who were 
supportive of the party. As Heper (1985: 102) notes: 
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the dependence of business and commercial groups on governmental 
policies and resources in areas such as import allocation, credit and 
investment and infrastructure continued after the transition to multi-party 
politics. The government closely controlled the various organizations set up 
by these groups.  
Heper (1985: 107) deals with the effects of the Ottoman political culture on the 
DP regime and argues that the DP regime opposed the RPP but not the 
transcendentalist state. Accordingly, political parties in Turkey have always 
thought that they could do anything they wished and could change the legal system 
as they saw fit. This understanding was true for the DP regime. Indeed the DP 
regime’s dependence on the national will became a fetish with them. DP leaders 
thought that since the nation had selected the party, the party that represented the 
national will had the right to monopolize and to use for their own purposes all the 
institutions of the state (Heper, 1985: 107). Thus, DP leaders viewed power as 
absolute (Heper, 1985: 106).  
 Inflationary policies as a result of the governing party’s attempt to sustain 
broad-based coalitions in order to remain in power became a habit of Turkish 
governments after DP. Both in the planned economy years and after the 
liberalization, inflation continued (Elder, 2004: 52). During the years of Import-
substituting industrialization, SEEs were used to distribute rents to the 
governments’ loyalists (Elder, 2004: 56). Moreover the conglomerates were 
satisfied with the ISI measures. Even Vehbi Koç demanded privileges such as 
guarantees for imports and stable exchange rates, state guidance and support on 
certain strategic sectors, and the stabilization of wage increases, through state 
intermediation (Elder, 2004: 57).  
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Liberalization of Turkish economy did not result with the end of populism. 
On the continuation of populism after the liberalization, Elder (2004: 53) notes 
that: 
 The Turkish case provides further evidence that neo-liberal 
technocrats suppress and/or circumvent mechanisms of accountability, and 
weaken institutional links between society and the state for the sake of 
‘efficient economic decision-making’. Therefore, accountability and 
representation, two fundamental pillars of any given democracy, are 
systematically undermined.  
 
 
The experience of Turkey under the rule of MP government is an example 
of the situation that Elder puts. MP government, with the aim of constructing and 
consolidating a ‘right-of-center coalition’ among groups with conflicting interests, 
pressed for rapid growth based on the expansion of the public sector (Öniş, 1992: 
12; Waterbury, 1988; Akalın, 2002; Öniş, 1991: 35). This tendency characterized 
the 1990s. Elder (2004: 61-62) notes that, during the first Süleyman Demirel-led 
(1991-1993) and later Tansu Çiller-led (1993-1995) centre-right coalitions of 
TPP, side payments were distributed to the constituencies of the governing 
parties. Moreover, during the MP-led coalition government (1997-1999) as well 
as WP-led coalition government (1995-1997), the picture was the same.  
Another sign of the continuity of populism in 1980s and 1990s was the 
exclusion of representative institutions from policy-making. Starting with MP 
government, technocratic elite, which was directly responsible to the prime 
minister, challenged the already existing institutions that represented the Turkish 
business (Elder, 2004: 59). The exclusion of the Turkish business from policy-
making through the technocratic decision-making is also evident in the IMF 
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agreements after the crisis of 1994, 1999 and 2001, in which IMF measures were 
not publicly discussed and Turkish businessmen were not consulted10.  
These resulted with a macroeconomic environment, characterized by fiscal 
deficits, high loan rates of interests and accelerating inflation (Öniş, 1992). Thus 
the liberalization of the economy did not accompanied by ‘retreat of the state’ 
from the economic realm, but the reconstruction of the state (Öniş, 1991: 28)11. 
Indeed, Turkey has been the only country that combined liberalization of trade in 
goods and in the financial markets with lack of stabilization after 1980 (Uğur, 
2004: 83). Thus Turkish case is described as ‘liberalization without stabilization” 
(Uğur, 2004: 83).  
The absence of macroeconomic stability as a consequence of populism and 
rent-seeking behavior ended with three economic crises in 1994, 1999 and 2001 
(Uğur, 2004: 84). This unstable environment discouraged foreign direct 
investment in Turkey12 
In this chapter, the characteristics of the strong state tradition are defined. 
Next chapter will deal with the consequences of the strong state tradition on the 
behavior of Turkish businessmen.  
 
                                               
10
 Öniş (Öniş, 1991: 38) argues that Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) that were provided by the 
IMF and the World Bank provided the policy-makers considerable freedom, which augmented the 
governments’ already existing autonomy.  
11
 An indicator of the state’s dominance in the economy is the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). 
IEF is a measure of “the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, 
distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary… to protect and 
maintain liberty itself” (Uğur, 2004: 90). According to the IEF scores, government intervention in 
economy has increased in Turkish case whereas it has decreased in the CEECs. Interestingly, there 
is a sharp increase in government intervention in the economy starting with 2002. This shows that 
Turkey has fallen apart in fulfilling Copenhagen economic criteria. This also indicates that despite 
the liberalization of Turkish economy, Turkish governments have critical role in shaping economy.  
12
 Uğur (2004: 84) notes that total FDI inflows between 1993 and 1998 amounted to the 2, 7 
percent of Turkey’s GDP in 1998 whereas the ratio was 34. 2 percent in Hungary, 25.9 percent in 
Czech Republic, and 19. 2 percent in Poland. In terms of stocks, FDI stock/GDP ratio for 1998 
was 3.8 percent in Turkey, but 12.1 percent in the Central Eastern European Countries.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKISH BUSINESS 
 
 
This chapter will deal with the consequences of the state tradition on the 
behavior of Turkish business. We argue of three consequences: firstly Turkish 
businessmen had the problem of legitimacy both in the eyes of the public and the 
national elites. This image was reinforced by the rent-seeking behavior of Turkish 
business, which was a result of highly unstable economic conditions, state 
protection and subsidies, and absence of a long-term economic policy.  
 
2.1 Legitimacy Problem 
 
Szyliowicz (2005: 193) notes that effective functioning of civil society 
depends on the permission of the state for such a space, and supportiveness of the 
political culture. For Turkey, the case was reverse. Thus, TÜSİAD as a civil 
society organization cannot function effectively in Turkey.  
Turkish businessmen have continuously faced with the problem of 
legitimacy in the eyes of both the national elites. For the state, entrepreneurs were 
potential sources of threat that could challenge the authority of the state and the 
order, which the state should protect. Thus, businessmen were put under the 
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control of state agencies. They were seen as legitimate as long as they supported 
official policies. Otherwise they were told to “look after their business” or “sell 
their villas” rather than dealing with the policies of the state, whether economic or 
foreign policy.  
Heper asserts that the bureaucratic elite not only supported business 
groups, but also frustrated their development. According to Heper, (1985: 102) 
bureaucratic elite perceived entrepreneurs as “profiteers” and “swindlers”. For 
example, in the 1950s, the Chamber of Commerce in Istanbul demanded that the 
bureaucracy be respectful of businessmen and not threaten them as ‘thieves with 
ties’ (Heper, 1985: 103). Heper (1985: 103) quotes the ideas of a businessman 
who noted:  
…. In Turkey, the notion of business is misunderstood. Often the 
businessman is viewed as a speculator, if not a thief. Business in general 
and retailing and wholesaling in particular, were for a long time 
downgraded and looked upon as occupations which no respectable Turk 
would enter…no great business heroes have emerged in Turkey, no 
entrepreneur has gained social recognition, and no business leader has ever 
held public office. 
 
Entrepreneur activity is not seen as legitimate in the eyes of the Turkish 
public. This is closely related to the political culture, which attributes primacy 
over particular interests.  In addition to this, Buğra (2005: 36) explains the lack of 
legitimacy of entrepreneurial activity with reference to late industrialization. 
According to Buğra, an ideology in which individual interests were dominant 
could not be allowed to develop due to late industrialization. Thus individualist 
values could not become a part of the political culture. This results with the 
importance of scarification of the individual preferences for the interest of the 
collectivity. According to a study conducted in 1958 on university students, most 
of the participants preferred “service to the nation” over “personal ideals” (Turan, 
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1988: 96). In such a political culture, entrepreneurial activity is permitted as long 
as it contributes to the interests of the collectivity: national development (Buğra, 
2005: 36).     
Businessmen were seen as seeking individual interests over the national 
interests. In order to reverse this image, businessmen constantly feel themselves 
necessary to say that “wealth is not a thing to be ashamed of” (Buğra, 2005: 16). 
Turkish businessmen lack confidence in attributing their actions to the desire for 
individual material gains. By analyzing the biographies of the Turkish 
businessmen, Buğra (2005: 16) claims that they try to legitimize their entrepreneur 
activities by dealing with the social benefits of their acts. Rather than being proud 
of their successes, they nearly apologize for their personal successes and try to 
point out how their successes serve the interests of the nation. They establish 
organizations, but avoid using terms such as interest and class. Rather they 
express their demands from the state with reference to the notion of national 
interest (Buğra, 2005: 59). 
 
2.2 Political Exclusion and Patronage Politics 
 
Non-state actors’ political participation of as a crisis is another result of the 
strong state tradition. Akarli (1975: 147) defines participation as a crisis as “a 
conflict that occurs when the governing elite views the demands or behavior of 
individuals and groups seeking to participate in the political system as 
illegitimate”.  
Turkish businessmen have been excluded from policy-making. Either their 
demand to participate in policy-making was seen as illegitimate, or they were 
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demanded to support the official policies but not to counter. Moreover the right to 
represent Turkish private sector was given to the chambers but voluntary and 
sectoral associations’ participation in policy-making was seen as illegitimate.  
Centralization of foreign exchange in the hands of the central authority 
during the ISI policy period made participation in policy-making for businessmen, 
especially for large industrialists, an important target.  Although participation in 
policy-making has been institutionalized, these institutions were weak and did not 
represent the industrial interests and the interests of conglomerates due to the 
representation system in the chambers. Thus, peak business in Turkey developed 
personal ties with the politicians, ministers and even the prime minister.  
Turkish businessmen’s relation with the government was an example of 
patronage politics. According to Kudat (1975: 66) patronage networks is based 
on:  
Face-to-face relations of a dyadic nature, involving parties of unequal 
status, wealth and maintenance of the relationship dependent on 
reciprocity in the imbalanced exchange of goods and services…; the 
patron usually provided protection and benefits, while the client supplied 
personal services, loyalty, assistance and general support.  
 
Main reason for Turkish business to engage in patronage politics was the 
“bureaucratic political economy” that existed in Turkey. Öniş (1992: 8) notes that 
the main characteristic of “bureaucratic political economy” is the dependence of 
profits and accumulation on policy rather than markets. This leads to the 
dependence of the entrepreneurs on the state than on markets. As a consequence 
of this, entrepreneurs are inclined to interact with policymakers and bureaucrats 
rather than to exploit market opportunities. Moreover, they are “less interested in 
articulating their interests and exerting pressure at the stage of policy-making and 
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more oriented towards individual manipulation at the implementation phase of 
policies” (Öniş, 1992: 18) 
This was the case during the ISI model. Import-substitution policy increased 
the dependency of Turkish business on state. İlkin (1993: 189) says that 
“government activities such as prohibiting-restricting the importing of goods 
which were produced domestically; providing foreign exchange for the import of 
capital goods and inputs; letting industrialists acquire inputs from the state 
economic enterprises; and giving credits with low interest rates” are the factors 
that contribute dependency of Turkish business on the state13. As a consequence 
of this, businessmen had to develop good relations with the state. For example 
former bureaucrats and even prime ministers, such as Naim Talu, were employed 
by the large firms (İlkin, 1993: 189). 
Another reason for Turkish businessmen to engage in patronage politics was 
the heavy costs of being in opposition. Bianchi (1984: 106) notes that the state 
relied on “grants of precarious and revocable privileges to those who cooperate in 
fulfilling its economic goals” and resisted to “the attempts of those enjoying such 
privileges to extend them and transform them into permanent and secure rights”. 
Thus, businessmen felt themselves necessary to develop good relations with the 
governing parties; otherwise they were punished. For example Sureyya Ilmen was 
punished by the RPP since he supported the opposition Republican Free Party 
during 1930 (İlkin, 1993: 190). Similarly, Vehbi Koç resigned from the RPP as a 
result of DP pressures (İlkin, 1993: 190; Buğra, 2005: 118).  
                                               
13
 The importance of the state as the source of foreign exchange becomes clear when we take the 
results of ISI model on the Turkish business. Bianchi notes that import-substitution led to a self-
sufficient industry in production of consumer goods but a heavy reliance on imported raw 
materials and investment goods (Bianchi, 1984: 48).  
 45 
 
The bureaucratic nature of political economy in Turkey made bureaucracy as 
an important target for Turkish businessmen since bureaucrats “constitute a 
strategic group involved in the formulation and implementation of development 
policies, the mobilization and allocation of resources, the establishment and 
operation of state enterprises, the provision of health, education and other 
services, as well as the regulation of many other aspects of national life” (Sunar, 
1974: 500). Thus, bureaucracy had important control over the mechanisms of rent 
distribution (Boratav et al, 1994: 65).  
Patronage politics and dependence of Turkish private sector to the state had an 
important consequence: fragmentation in Turkish business. Sunar (1974) argues of 
a rivalry among the middle class for a better share of the state resources. By 
referring to the bourgeoisie and the intermediary strata, including bureaucrats, 
professional and managerial groups and even the skilled workers, Sunar (1974: 
483) says: 
Action taken by these intermediate groups was in the form of pressure 
to open up the circle of privilege and to obtain a better share of the limited 
opportunities. Once they had succeeded, the result was not the 
implementation of basic social changes but the formation of a new network 
of protective relationships in the form of kinship and patronage-clientage 
ties, which served to maintain and improve the ‘middle class status reserved 
for the few’  
 
As a result of tendency to develop direct relations with the officers in order to 
obtain particular interests, Turkish business could not form strong interest groups. 
Heper (1985: 104) states that the state-dependent nature of the Turkish 
entrepreneurs prevented the rise of strong interest groups and led to the emphasis 
of the entrepreneurs on establishing good relations with the policy makers and 
individual manipulation of the implementation phase of politics. Thus, they could 
not act as strong pressure groups, except in times of crisis. This was evident in 
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TÜSİAD’s passive stance during the Özal government. Therefore, until the rise of 
an important threat, Turkish peak business could not form powerful organizations.  
 
2.3 Rent-Seeking Behavior 
 
Rent-seeking tendency is the third consequence of the dependence of Turkish 
business for state support. According to a study conducted by the sociologist 
Findikoglu in 1965, Turkish entrepreneurs unlike their European counterparts, 
lack economic initiative, willingness to save and enthusiasm for long-term 
investments. The situation did not change in the post-liberalization period. Indeed, 
a study conducted by TÜSİAD on entrepreneurship in Turkey points out the 
businessmen’s reluctance to take risks (Türkiye’de Girişimcilik, 2002) Thus, 
Turkish entrepreneurs, with a non-enterprising spirit and opportunist character, 
preferred quick profits (Heper, 1985:104).  
Buğra (2005: 59) explains this tendency with reference to the absence of long-
term growth strategies. Buğra argues that, when compared to Korea, Turkey does 
not have a permanent economic policy. This contributes to economic uncertainty 
and prevents entrepreneurs from seeing themselves as industrialists. Rather, they 
prefer acquiring short-term rents to their competitiveness or productivity (Buğra, 
2005: 56). 
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Sunar (1974: 490) explains the rent-seeking behavior with the state protection 
that they have, and states that: 
If Turkish industrialists are not very familiar with the uncertainty, 
which accompanies risk-taking and innovative activity, this is not only 
because of their privileged social origins but also because of the unusual 
protection that they enjoy in the form of state-patronage, monopoly 
opportunities, and concentration of control. For instance Turkish 
industrialists are not threatened by, but welcome state ‘intervention’ in 
the form of state subsidies and the protection they receive in exploiting a 
limited market. Protected by enormously high tariffs, their fear is not 
state ‘intervention’ but competition in any form, whether public or 
private. The state in Turkey has not been a threat but an instrument in 
the creation and the protection of a national industrial class. 
 
In a similar vein, Uğur (2004) argues that etatist policies have encouraged 
rent-seeking behavior. According to Uğur, private economic actors realized that 
they could exchange political support for privileged access to economic resources 
controlled by the state (Uğur, 2004: 77). For Uğur rent-seeking behavior was 
necessary since businessmen had to balance the risks brought by discretionary 
policies with side payments from the state.  
Öniş draws attention to the concept of populist democracy in order to explain 
the rent-seeking behavior of Turkish entrepreneurs. Öniş (1992: 6) says that 
“economic reform undertaken without the close cooperation of key societal 
groups is likely to generate uncertainty, mistrust, and alienation on the part of 
economic agents and encourage ‘free riding’”.  
Thus, until late 1970s Turkish private sector was more committed to the 
preservation of the status quo rather than its change. State that protected and 
subsidized low-productivity and high profit units of production was preferred by 
the peak industrialists (Sunar, 1974: 498). Consequently, Turkish industrialists, 
lacking any foreign competition, oriented towards “costly, inefficient and small-
scale” production (Bianchi, 1984: 54). Moreover, they directed their production 
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towards highly-protected and more-profitable domestic market than to industrial 
exports (Bianchi, 1984: 56).  
Liberalization of Turkish economy did not result with the disappearance of 
rent-seeking behavior among Turkish businessmen but changed its way (Uğur, 
2004: 80). For example overinvoicing exports as a result of businessmen’s attempt 
to benefit from export subsidies had amounted for the 10% of total exports in the 
second half of 1980s (Boratav et al, 1994: 62). Thus the export-oriented economic 
policy, which created new rents was used by the business; indeed it encouraged 
‘export-oriented rent-seeking’ (Öniş, 1992: 17)14. Boratav et al (1994: 62) relate 
this to the traditional aim of Turkish state to create a national bourgeoisie and 
(Boratav et, al, 1994: 62) note: 
…in most Third World countries the bourgeoisie itself is a creation of 
the state and this historical phenomenon has created cultural, sociological 
and economic traits, which do not disappear with changes in the policy 
model  
 
 Uğur (2004: 95) explains continuation of the rent-seeking behavior as a 
result of incorrect sequencing. According to Uğur, if new rules and institutions 
that would check rent-seeking were introduced before the liberalization of Turkish 
economy, rent-seeking would decrease. However the case was the reverse in 
Turkey. Thus, rent-seeking became a habit of Turkish businessmen.  
 In this chapter, the effects of strong state tradition on the behaviors of 
Turkish business have been analyzed. Next chapter will deal with TÜSİAD’s 
basic characteristics and the reflections of the consequences dealt above, on 
TÜSİAD-state relations.  
                                               
14
 Öniş (Öniş, 1991: 31-32) points out the formation of the Foreign Trade Companies (FTC) as a 
result of the export promotion measures. In order to benefit from export tax rebates, large holdings 
formed FTCs and increased their share for about 50 percent of Turkish exports by the second half 
of the 1980s. Öniş argues that creation of FTCs encouraged export-rent seeking.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
TÜSİAD 
 
 
 
This chapter will deal with the general characteristics and historical 
development of TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD has shifted its focus from the economic to the 
political realm and foreign policy problems. Indeed, in late 1990s and early 2000s, 
TÜSİAD has solely focused on political matters. The reason for TÜSİAD’s 
insistence on the EU membership of Turkey is related to TÜSİAD’s attempt to 
restructure the business-state relations and to reverse domination of state over the 
economic realm that led to three economic crises in 1990s. TÜSİAD takes EU as 
a permanent external anchor that can democratize the state structure in favor of 
business and can contribute to the strengthening of business’s position in Turkey. 
Moreover EU membership is seen as the only way to stabilize the political and 
economic structure that had been characterized by crises in the 1990s and early 
2001. In order to understand the interest of TÜSİAD in EU membership, we will 
deal with the TÜSİAD-state relations in which, business’s position is unclear and 
dependent on the state.  
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3.1 General Characteristics 
 
TÜSİAD is an associational interest group that was established on 2 
August 1971 by the14 largest Turkish industrialists who had close relations with 
national authorities15. Following the announcement of the establishment of the 
association in the newspapers in the same day, its membership increased to 106. 
By 2005, TÜSİAD had 545 members representing around 1300 companies 
(TÜSİAD 2005 Brochure: 12). Its activities include offering assistance in 
education, guiding and counseling enterprises, and efforts with direct policy 
implications, such as “activities to channel the investments to the priorities of 
public interest and to the productive areas that give impetus to exports and earn 
foreign exchange” (Weiker, 1980.: 96.). TÜSİAD is a private association with 
voluntary membership. Unlike TOBB, TÜSİAD is a non-hierarchical organization 
with non-compulsory membership. Consequently, the continuation of TÜSİAD 
depends on the donations of the members16.  
An important factor that contributes to ease the individual conflicts 
between members is the homogenous structure of the organization. TÜSİAD is an 
elite organization whose members hold common sociopolitical approaches and 
university degrees, even graduate degrees. This elite stricture is reinforced by the 
entry requirements. According to the article 5 of TÜSİAD’s by-law, any real 
person that accepts the purpose of TÜSİAD listed in the 2nd article can become a 
                                               
15
 Founders of TÜSİAD were Vehbi Koç of Koç Holding, 'Dr. Nejat Eczacıbaşı of Eczacıbaşı HC, 
Sakıp Sabancı of Hacı Ömer HC, Selçuk Yaşar of Yaşar HC, Raşit Öszaruhan of Metaş of Joint 
Stock Company (JSC), Ahmet Sapmaz of Güney Industries JSC, Feyyaz Berker of Tekfen JSC, 
Melih Özakat of Automotive JSC, İbrahim Bodur of Çanakkale Ceramics, Hikmet Erenyol of 
Electro-Metallurgy JSC, Osman Boyner of Altınyıldız Textiles JSC, Muzaffer Gazioğlu of 
Cement Industries JSC. (Arat, 1991: 137) 
16
 Gülfidan (1993: 25) notes that Sabancı and Koç were each paying 60 million Turkish Liras in 
1988 when the lowest membership fee was 4 million Turkish Liras. 
 51 
 
member17. To be a candidate, one should be proposed by two members of 
TÜSİAD. Although being a Turkish citizen is a pre-condition for membership, 
non-Turks can be candidates with if they have residency and posses other 
qualifications required for Turkish citizens listed in the by-law. Additionally, 
members should comply with the “principles of business ethics” set out by the 
Boards of Directors. Candidates’ applications are examined by the majority of the 
Boards of Directors within 30 days. In this sense, compliance with the code of 
business ethics and approval of the general ideals of the Association are as 
important as economic considerations for TÜSİAD membership (Vorhoff, 2001: 
318).  Thus, as Haluk Nuray comments, this homogenous structure, enormous 
wealth and similar interests pursued by TÜSİAD’s members have had many 
advantages in the effective representation of the association (Cited by Karaca, 
2005). 
TÜSİAD is criticized for losing its elitist structure. Inan Kirac, an ex-
member of TÜSİAD argues that TÜSİAD lost its function to take binding 
decisions since everyone was allowed to enter the Association in order to finance 
                                               
17
 2nd article of the by-law is on purpose of TÜSİAD. The article is as follows:  
“Committed to the universal principles of democracy and human rights, together with the 
freedoms of enterprise, belief and opinion, TÜSİAD seeks to promote the development of a social 
structure which conforms to Ataturk's principles and reforms, and strives to fortify the concept of a 
democratic civil society and a secular state of law in Turkey; TÜSİAD believes that industrialists 
and business people perform a leading role in Turkish society and acts on this conviction; 
TÜSİAD aims to establish the legal and institutional framework of a market economy and ensures 
the application of internationally accepted business ethics; TÜSİAD believes in and works for the 
idea of integration within the inter- national economic system, by increasing the competitiveness 
of the Turkish industrial and services sectors, thereby assuring itself of a well defined and 
permanent place in the economic arena; TÜSİAD supports all policies aimed at the establishment 
of a liberal economic system which uses human and natural resources more efficiently by means 
of the latest technological innovations and which tries to create proper conditions for a permanent 
increase in productivity and quality, thus enhancing competitiveness; TÜSİAD, in accordance with 
its mission and in the context of its activities, initiates public debate by communicating its position 
supported by professional research directly to the parliament, the government, the media, 
international organizations and other states.  
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the Association (2005 Gündemi: 65). Moreover, as will be explained below, the 
legitimacy problem of the private sector and its dependence on the state for 
support has contributed to overwhelm internal conflicts and economic matters 
(Schneider, 2002: 82). Thus, as Gülfidan (1993) notes, continuation of the 
clientalistic relations with the national authorities challenges the power of 
TÜSİAD.  
 
3.2 Economic Characteristics 
 
TÜSİAD acts as the spokesman for the leading industrialists, holdings, 
banking community, insurance companies, construction sector and other services, 
based mainly in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (Gülfidan, 1993:25; Özbudun, 2000: 
132). Thus, TÜSİAD members have a wide range of economic activities.  
TÜSİAD is the association of the big business in Turkey. This is evident in 
the research conducted by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry in 1986. According to 
the research, TÜSİAD had 62 members among100 largest private sector 
companies. The shares of these member companies in production sales, gross 
value added and profit for 1986 were 71.7, 69.9 and 72.5 (Gülfidan, 1993: 26). 
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Table 1: Total Production of TÜSİAD Member Companies in Billion 
Dollars18 
BILLION$ 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Sales 
revenue 
Value 
added 
Sales 
revenue 
Value 
added 
Sale 
revenue 
Value 
added 
Sales 
revenue 
Value 
added 
TÜSİAD 65.7 28.9 63.9 28.1 66.7 29.4 69.6 30.6 
  69.4  70.7  63.6  65.0 
  41.6  39.7  46.2  47.1 
Source: TÜSİAD Brochure 2005 
 
The companies represented by TÜSİAD occupy a dominant role in 
Turkish economy (Table 1). According to the TÜSİAD 2000 membership profile, 
the total sales volume of 227 firms was $69, 6 billion which amounted to $30, 6 
billion value added. Thus 227 members of TÜSİAD produced 47% of Turkey’s 
value added in the industry, construction and financial sectors. Moreover, these 
firms employed more than 414,000 people.  
 
Table 2: Share of TÜSİAD Member Firms in Total Export  
BILLION $ 1997 1998 1999 2000 
TÜSİAD  9.2 11.8 12.5 13.1 
TOTAL 
TURKISH 
EXPORT 
26.2 27.0 26.6 27.8 
SHARE OF 
TÜSİAD % 
35.1 43.7 46.8 47 
Source: TÜSİAD Brochure 2005 
Table 3: Share of TÜSİAD Member Firms in Total Import 
BILLION$ 1997 1998 1999 2000 
TÜSİAD 10.1 7.9 8.9 9.9 
TOTAL 
TURKISH 
IMPORT 
48.6 45.9 40.7 54.5 
SHARE OF 
TÜSİAD % 
20.8 17.1 21.8 18.2 
Source: TÜSİAD Brochure 2005 
 
 
                                               
18
 total value added of industry, construction and financial institutions 
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TÜSİAD has taken the leading role in Turkish foreign trade (Table2; Table 
3). As of 2000, the volume of exports and imports generated by TÜSİAD 
members was $13 billion and $9 billion respectively. Thus, TÜSİAD members 
generate 47.2% of Turkish exports and 18.2% of Turkish imports.  
The huge value of TÜSİAD firms’ trade activities is related to the export-
oriented growth policy of the 1980s. With the 24 January 1980 decisions, the 
Özal’s regime started to promote the growth of exports as a source of foreign 
exchange in two ways: firstly, the domestic demand was cut by use of various 
policies such as devaluation of the Turkish lira and wage cuts. These policies were 
reinforced by strict control over trade union activities and the prohibition of 
strikes after the 1980 intervention. Secondly, Özal government directly subsidized 
export-oriented firms. Although export substitution was abolished in 1988, it had 
provided great incentive for firms to produce for the international market. 
 
Figure 1: Destination of TÜSİAD Member Firms’ Exports  
 
(Source: TÜSİAD brochure 2005) 
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Like that of Turkey, major countries to which TÜSİAD members export are the 
EU countries (Figure 1). They are either direct exporters or partners with EU 
firms for industrial and contracting projects in the third countries (Turkey: A New 
Corporate World for Europe, 2004: 24) 
 
Besides being exporters, TÜSİAD member firms have become direct investors 
in European markets. They have seized opportunities created by Romania’s and 
Bulgaria’s accession not yet to EU and they have shifted their investments in 
these counties (Turkey: A New Corporate World for Europe, 2004: 23). They 
have also been busy creating a common pattern of consumption in the Eastern 
Europe (Turkey: A New Corporate World for Europe, 2004: 20). TÜSİAD 
believes that Turkish private sector is more competitive than that of the ex-
communist countries due to the import-substitution industry model. Accordingly, 
import substitution that aimed to nurture the young industry contributed to Turkey 
in developing an industrial base and an effective transport and energy 
infrastructure. Moreover, Turkish entrepreneurs had developed market rationality 
since the prices were determined by the markets. Thus import substitution 
contributed to the managerial, labor and marketing skills of Turkish industry 
(Turkey: A New Corporate World for Europe, 2004: 30). 
Although TÜSİAD is disturbed by the economic instability, it believes that 
unstable economy taught important lessons for Turkish firms. In the brochure 
“Turkey: A New Corporate World for Europe”, the success of Turkish business in the 
foreign markets is explained with these words (2004: 21):  
If Turkish businessmen have a skill in developing new and challenging 
markets, it is one developed from mastering their own domestic market. 
Turkish managers, used to coping with chronic inflation, stop-start growth, 
devaluation and interest rate crises, see themselves as a case-hardened breed.  
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TÜSİAD’s membership is composed of both the owners of the firms and 
the professional managers. Although TÜSİAD’s founders were all owners of 
groups, the number of professional managers in TÜSİAD has increased in recent 
years (Koyuncu, 2003). Kurtuluş (1987) explains this tendency with reference to 
the economic difficulties that TÜSİAD member companies faced in the post-
liberalization period. According to Kurtulus, high inflation rate and high interest 
rates that made the cost of borrowing prohibitive forced large firms to use 
professional managers. 
Figure 2: Sectoral Breakdown 
 
Source: TÜSİAD Brochure 2005 
 
TÜSİAD members represent almost all major sector of Turkish economy 
(Figure 2). However, the dominant sectors that accommodate the highest number 
of TÜSİAD members are the food, beverages and tobacco sectors. This sector is 
followed by the energy sector and later by the chemicals, petrol, coal, rubber and 
plastic sectors. 
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TÜSİAD’s power over the governments comes from the economic power of 
TÜSİAD members. Henry Barkey (cited by Shambayati, 1994: 315) notes that 
“since it is composed of the richest business enterprises, no government could 
ignore it (TÜSİAD)”. By comparing Turkey and Iran, Shambayati uses the term to 
explain the power of TÜSİAD in Turkey with reference to the concept of ‘rentier 
state’ (Shambayati, 1994). According to Shambayati (1994: 308), rentier state is a 
state “that receives a substantial portion of its income in the form of external 
rents”. This leads to the financial independence of the government from the 
domestic productive sectors. For Shambayati (1994: 317), Turkey, which lacks 
external rents and stable sources of external capital, such as oil revenues as in the 
case of Iran, is dependent on the domestic sources of capital. Shambayati’s 
argument is more valid in the post-liberalization period in which TÜSİAD 
member companies have lend foreign exchanges gained from the exports to the 
governments. This leads to the increasing importance of Turkish conglomerates in 
the eyes of the government.  
TÜSİAD member firms also have significance in the media sector. After 
the eradication of the monopoly of TRT, the state’s monopoly over mass 
communication, Turkey experienced the concentration of media assets in the 
hands of a few holdings19. Kongar notes that these holdings have become 
important actors in shaping public opinion in Turkey (Kongar, 2002). Thus media 
ownership of TÜSİAD firms has contributed to the political power of the 
association in shaping foreign policy.  
 
 
                                               
19
 Dogan Holding, which is a member of TÜSİAD currently, dominates the Turkish media 
ownership and is considered as “Turkish Berlusconi”. (Larrabee&Lesser, 2003: 33) 
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Table 4: Distribution of members according to dates of incorporation of 
member companies of TÜSİAD in 1991  
 
Date of incorporation Number of firms Percentage 
Before 1950 15 5 
1950-59 32 11 
1960-69 56 19 
1970-79 107 36 
1980-89 85 28 
After 1990 6 2 
Total  301 101 
Source: Çokgezen, 2000 
Most of the TÜSİAD members have benefited from the import substitution 
industry model (Table 4). When we examine the date of incorporation of TÜSİAD 
member firms, we witness that majority of member firms of TÜSİAD has been 
established in the period between 1970 and 1979 a period that has been 
characterized by high tariff walls, cheap foreign exchange and negative interest 
rates. Thus, the date of corporation of TÜSİAD member firms confirms the fact 
that state has aimed to develop national private industry. However the relation 
between the state and big business was a problematic one. Indeed the 
governments supported the private sector when it supported the government but 
could challenge when the relation was problematic.  
After the liberalization of Turkish economy, we witness the shift of big 
business’ economic activities from industry to finance sector. As Öniş (2004: 23) 
notes, TÜSİAD member companies did not face difficulties obtaining to credits 
since they already had their own banks or the reputation for borrowing credits 
from external and domestic resources in the post-liberalization period. Moreover, 
they had superior access to state resources.  
Despite this privileged financial position, the shift from industry to finance 
sector can be understood with reference to the rent-seeking behavior. According 
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to Öniş and Bakır (2005), Turkish economic growth in 1990s that was heavily 
dependent on the accumulation of domestic and external debt and inflows of 
short-term speculative capital contributed to generation of a rentier class that 
favored lending to the government at high rates of interests. As a consequence, 
profitability of big business became dependent on their financial rather than 
manufacturing activities. This rent-seeking behavior of TÜSİAD members has 
contributed to the power of peak business on the government since they are lender 
to the government.  
 
3.3 TUSIAD on Government 
 
As Buğra (2005:17) asserts, Turkish entrepreneurs have a love-hate 
relation with the state. Accordingly, business has considered the state to be 
important in protecting their societal position and wealth. But they also think of 
the state as the fundamental reason for the difficulties they face. Thus, they do not 
necessarily favor decrease of state intervention in the economy, but favor closer 
relations with the state on policy making. They have not drawn a clear separation 
between the economy and the politics, and have remaining qualms about letting 
the economy operate according to the rules of free market.  
TÜSİAD believes that the economy is strongly related to the political 
system. For TÜSİAD, economic issues should not be dealt with independent of 
political and social issues (Görüş August 2001: 6). Thus TÜSİAD argues in favor 
of political reforms in line with the political criteria of the EU for a stable 
economy.  
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TÜSİAD believes that the economic crisis is a consequence of an 
inefficient, extremely centralized, clumsy and out-moded government mechanism 
that cannot respond to the demands of the public (Görüş, November 2001: 6).  
The main responsibility for the economic problems belongs to the government’s 
reluctant attitude towards the reform of the economic and political system in line 
with the structural adjustment program of the IMF. TÜSİAD ex-chairman Tuncay 
Özilhan argues that the government’s lack of intention to apply the adjustment 
programs led to the 2001 economic crisis (Görüş, May 2001: 6). To avoid crisis, 
Özilhan argues that the economy should work based on the market rules rather 
than the political interests (Görüş, November 2001: 6). Thus the state should not 
intervene in productive sectors; it should be limited to a regulatory role in the 
global era (Görüş, December 2003: 6). He proposes reform of the public 
administration, by which the government should do the followings: allow 
effective participation of the civil society in the decision-taking mechanisms of 
the reform process; establish legal and administrative infrastructure for civil 
society’s participation; ensure transparent and accountable reform; empower local 
authorities; reorganize the public administration according to economic 
rationality; and avoid malpractice (Görüş, December 2003: 6-7).  
TÜSİAD understands crises as opportunities to force the government to 
accept structural adjustment. Özilhan points to the positive effects of the 
economic crisis on the political structure. He says that the crisis proved the need 
for effective and efficient governance based on the necessities of the period 
(Görüş, May 2001: 6).  
TÜSİAD perceives Turkey as a member of European civilization. 
According to Bahadır Kaleağası, head of Brussels Representation of TÜSİAD, 
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using the term ‘meeting of the civilizations’ to explain Turkey’s position in the 
Europe is misleading since using this term means to exclude Turkey from the 
European civilization and to accept the validity of the Huntington’s thesis of clash 
of civilizations. Rather, he proposes to refer to the universality of the European 
civilization of which Islam is a part (Zaman, January 2006). TÜSİAD also wants 
government to be the bearer of European values in its policies towards Asia and 
the Middle East (TÜSİAD press release, 2005).  
TÜSİAD demands more roles in foreign policy making from the Turkish 
authorities. Vice President of the High Advisory Council of TÜSİAD Aldo 
Kaslowski,  draws attention to the importance of lobbying activities of the civil 
society for the homeland and states that the strength of the lobbying activities of 
civil society depends on the role of civil society in shaping foreign policy making 
(Bülten, April-June 2003: 8). With the aim of contributing to Turkey’s medium 
and long-term foreign policy, TÜSİAD established the Foreign Policy Forum in 
25 September 2002 with the partnership of Bogaziçi University (TÜSİAD 2003 
Çalışmaları: 62). TÜSİAD also organized Bosporus Prize for European 
Understanding in order to reward the people that have contributed to Turkey-EU 
relations (TÜSİAD 2003 Çalışmaları: 77).  
TÜSİAD claims to represent the broad and long-term interests of Turkey 
that the governments could not take into account due to their populist stances. 
According to ex-chairman of TÜSİAD Muharrem Kayhan, TÜSİAD kept its 
focus on the country’s long-term objectives in times of political and economic 
fluctuations and acted as a light house helping Turkey to find its way during 
stormy times (Newsletter, January-June 2004: 1).  
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TÜSİAD members associate their interests with the long-term interests of 
Turkey. According to Vehbi Koç businessmen should be loyal to Turkey and say 
that “my existence depends on the existence of this country” (Görüş Almanak, 
2002: 9). In a similar vein, Bülent Eczacibasi says that the success of the 
democratic pressure groups depends on their tendency to unite their interests with 
those of the country (Görüş Almanak, 2002: 2). He demands TÜSİAD to decide 
on the interests of Turkey and to direct the targets and strategies of the private 
sector to the interests of the society. He argues that the success of Turkish firms in 
the global economy characterized by competition and export-orientation will 
contribute to the socio-economic development of the Turkish society. Thus 
TÜSİAD should assist the politicians to overcome the obstacles for Turkish firms’ 
success. Beside the dialogue with the politicians, Eczacibasi argues that TÜSİAD 
should also develop a public opinion in line with the arguments of TÜSİAD since 
groups that create policy behind the closed doors and that lack the public support 
cannot be successful.  
 
3.4 Historical Development of TUSIAD 
 
This part will deal with the historical development of TUSIAD as well as the 
changing attitude of TUSIAD towards the governments.   
 
3.4.1 1970-1980 
 
In the 1970s, TÜSİAD aimed to increase the legitimacy of the Turkish 
private sector in order to counter the rising left. The rise of the left is important as 
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a challenge to the private sector. As we have seen, the private sector has lacked a 
legitimate tradition in Turkish political culture. Moreover, with the rise of the left, 
the private sector, especially those that had contacts with foreign firms, were 
labeled “comprador” and as an obstacle to the development of Turkey. Under 
these conditions, Turkish conglomerates felt themselves necessary to modify this 
image and to increase the legitimacy of private entrepreneurship that Turkey 
lacked (Gülfidan, 1993; Öncü, 1980). 
Another reason for the formation of TÜSİAD was the problem of under 
representation in the legal bodies of interest representation. As described above, 
interest representation in Turkey was provided by the chambers. Chambers act as 
semi-official representatives of private interests that consult the state in economic 
matters. However chambers could not function as efficient mechanisms of 
business representations for two reasons: the organizational structure of the 
chambers and the close contacts with the governing parties. According to the first 
explanation, chambers in Turkey represent industrial and commercial interests but 
neglects prominent sectoral divisions within industry and commerce. That is 
industrialists were in favor of protectionist measures whereas commercial sector 
supported the removal of them (Shambayati, 1994: 315). Shambayati (1994: 315) 
notes that TOBB that was responsible of allocating import quotas used this 
authority in favor of commercial interests that were dominant in TOBB. In a 
similar vein, Öncü (1980: 459) states that, as a result of the weighted 
representation, commercial interests dominate the assembly20. Thus, while 
distributing quotas and licenses, TOBB officials gave priority to commercial 
                                               
20
 In 1973, chambers of industry had 6 percent of the votes whereas chambers of commerce had 64 
percent which proves the dominance of commercial interests over the industrial ones (Öncü, 1980: 
459) 
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firms, which limited the ability of industrialists to purchase their requirements of 
imported raw materials (Bianchi, 1984: 253). This led to the under representation 
of industrial interests which resulted with the formation of TÜSİAD in 1971. 
Indeed industrialists were satisfied with the government’s decision to transfer 
import allocations to the ministry of finance (Shambayati, 1994: 315)21.   
One of the leading Istanbul industrialists points to the inefficiency of the 
chambers originating in the heterogeneous structure of the private sector (Quoted 
by Weiker, 1981: 92.): 
Everybody should know that private sector in Turkey is not as 
influential and effective pressure group as it is often thought. It is 
heterogeneous and intra-sector jealousies are all-pervasive. It is not well 
organized. Istanbul versus Anatolia competition persists. Large industry is 
always in conflict with small industry. Some of the chambers of industry 
do not view favorably the TÜSİAD, which they think is an exclusive club 
of big industrialists. There are no close ties between the chambers of 
commerce and industry. Only one third of the employers have been 
organized within the (Turkish) confederation (of Employers’ Associations)  
 
Second problem related to TOBB was the organization of the chambers on 
regional basis, which ended with under representation of the economically 
powerful groups when compared to the powerless ones. Industrial and commercial 
activities in Turkey are located in three major cities: Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. 
However the chambers of these cities that are economically powerful cannot 
dominate the general assembly of TOBB. Öncü (1980: 461) states that delegates 
from these three cities constitute only 17% of votes in the general assembly 
whereas these provinces account for the 90% of economic activity.  This results 
with the domination of commercial interests of small ‘Anatolian’ chambers.  
                                               
21
 Although TÜSİAD members diverted their economic activities and had both commercial and 
industrial interests, the prevailing one was the industrial sector.  Indeed TÜSİAD was founded by 
20 holding companies and 65 industrial companies (Weiker, 1981:  97), Moreover the founders of 
TÜSİAD, Koç, Sabancı and Eczacibasi Holdings, during 1970s had invested in industry. Thus 
TÜSİAD during 1970s represented the industrial interests.  
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Öncü (1980: 461) states that direct access to ministers, bureaucrats and 
even prime minister have been used by the chambers of these three provinces in 
order to cope with the inefficiency of TOBB in representing powerful chambers. 
This is a typical situation in Turkish politics: when the legal ways are not enough 
for interest representation, Turkish businessmen prefer to develop direct contacts 
with the influential figures in policy making. However when the direct contacts, 
which can be considered as the patronage relation, do not satisfy the demands of 
Turkish business, they may prefer voluntary associations as a way to influence 
policy making. Bianchi (1984: 132) states that: 
There continues to be considerable room to maneuver groups that 
become dissatisfied with the kinds of clientalistic relationships established 
between the government and the leaders of public associations. If those 
relations are perceived as yielding insufficient benefits for the association 
membership or as exclusively serving the interests of a favored, dominant 
faction, disgruntled leaders can resort to the alternative channel of 
voluntary associations to promote their specific interests in a more 
independent manner. In such cases private associations can be transformed 
from weak and insignificant extensions of their more privileged and 
influential corporatist counterparts into more specialized, competing 
channels of representation that may form political alliances with 
opposition partners. Private groups that succeed in establishing such 
alliances cannot, of course, compensate for the absence of official 
privilege and may, in fact, front a hostile response from the government. 
But even in such attempts prove self-defeating in the short, they can have 
the effect of the seriously undermining the representational monopolies of 
dominant, public associations and jeopardizing their position as the most 
authoritative spokesmen for an entire occupational or economic sector.   
 
 TÜSİAD had not been an effective organization until the late 1970s, when 
Turkish economy faced a balance-of-payments crisis. ISI model has been 
successful in sustaining industrialization (Koyuncu, 2003: 133). ISI model came 
into crisis in 1977 due to “negative trade balance and foreign exchange crisis by 
increasing imports of capital and intermediate goods” (Shambayati, 1994: 312). 
Moreover the increase in the costs of energy and other imported materials 
contributed to the crisis (Öniş, 1992: 8). Turkish government chose to solve the 
problem of foreign exchange deficit through external borrowing. This led to the 
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increase of external debt22. In addition to these, the remittances of Turkish 
workers overseas could be used to solve the problem of foreign exchange deficit 
only in the short term (Shambayati, 1994: 313).  
During the crisis, Ecevit government tried to restore economic stability 
through “adjustment of exchange rates, elimination of subsidies to bring domestic 
prices inline with world prices and reductions in the government deficit” 
(Gülfidan, 1993: 88). However these measures did not contribute to the increase 
in export. On the other hand, the relations with the IMF broke down (Hale, 1981: 
243). These developments ended with foreign exchange shortage, which Turkish 
business heavily needed. 
In response to these developments, TÜSİAD prepared a report (Gülfidan, 
1993: 87-88). According to the report, Turkey had lost its credibility in the West. 
TÜSİAD also accused the government fore failing IMF to take into consideration. 
However TÜSİAD report was not welcomed by the Ecevit government. Thus, 
TÜSİAD, which failed to directly affect the government, used the mass media in 
order to obtain public support. TÜSİAD started an advertisement campaign 
against the Ecevit government (Özel, 2003). According to the advertisement, the 
reason behind the crisis was “the extreme interventionist and confidence shaking 
mentality which strangles our (Turkish) economy by a prohibitive net of 
procedures, discouraging private initiative” (Gülfidan, 1993: 91). According to 
TÜSİAD, the problem was not with the economic policy of Ecevit but was about 
the implementation of the policy. This tendency to take governments’ lack of will 
in implementation of the neo-liberal economic policies as the main reason of 
economic crisis in 1990s was a general characteristic of TÜSİAD.  
                                               
22
 Shambayati (1994: 313) notes that Turkish external debt rose from 1.854 million $ in 1970 to 
4323 millions $ in 1977.  
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TÜSİAD’s public campaign ended with the resignation of Ecevit government 
and formation of the Justice Party government under the leadership Süleyman 
Demirel. During the JP rule, the government announced the 24 January 1980 
measures that embodied the following objectives (Öniş, 1991: 27): making prices 
flexible; removing controls not only on prices but also on quantities; reducing 
direct government participation in the economy; and avoiding the de-stabilization 
of the economy through fiscal deficits, inflation and external debt accumulation.  
TÜSİAD welcomed the 24January measures. However the JP government 
could not find the chance to implement the measures due to the 12 September 
1980 military intervention by which all political and associational activities, 
including those of TÜSİAD, were suspended. 
 
3.4.2 1980-1990 
 
In the 1980s, the division between the TÜSİAD members widened has 
risen. As a consequence of its internal divisions, TÜSİAD could not act as a 
powerful pressure group until the end of 1980s, when the macroeconomic stability 
had been disturbed due to the populist policies of the MP government. 
Additionally Turkey’s application to EU had been helped TÜSİAD to overcome 
its internal divisions. However TÜSİAD’s main emphasis had been on the 
economic issues (Öniş, 2001: 13).   
TÜSİAD’s activities after the intervention were suspended for nine days. 
However the temporary government under the prime ministry of Bülent Ulusu did 
not oppose TÜSİAD. Indeed some TÜSİAD members were appointed to key 
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ministries on economy during the Ulusu government (Dodd, 1992: 27)23. Thus 
TÜSİAD opted for stability at the expense of democracy (Öniş, 2001: 12-13). 
However this does not mean that TÜSİAD was allowed to participate in economic 
policy-making in an institutionalized fashion (Öniş, 1992: 17).  
Despite its support for the military intervention, TÜSİAD did not want the 
military to stay for a long time. One of the founders of TÜSİAD, Vehbi Koç 
wanted transition to democracy after the legislative reforms. He noted that “the 
Western countries would not be inclined to keep their promises if the military did 
not allow retransition to democracy, as they had done after the previous military 
interventions” (Cited by Gülfidan, 1993: 93). Thus TÜSİAD gave support for the 
military regime with the condition of transition to democracy, which they thought 
would restore the relations with the Western countries, especially, the EC.  
TÜSİAD supported the anti-democratic laws and the constitution drafted 
after the 1980 intervention. TÜSİAD’s support for the 1980 intervention can be 
explained with reference to three factors: firstly, the military had the sole political 
power to save and restructure the status quo (Cizre, 1997:157). The military 
demanded a parliament with two parties representing the center left and right. 
This was in parallel to TÜSİAD’s demand for a stable political order 
(Öniş&Türem, 2002: 443). Secondly the military continued the policies of 
economic liberalization supported by TÜSİAD. Thirdly, TÜSİAD was conscious 
of the fact that its survival depended on maintaining good relations with the 
military regime, which was an extension of the state-business relations in Turkey. 
It is important to note that TÜSİAD never supported an undemocratic order per 
                                               
23
 These ministers who were TÜSİAD members were the followings: Şahap Kocatopcu (Minister 
of Industry), Fahir Ilkel (minister for power and natural resources), Turgut Özal (Deputy minister 
for economic affairs), (Gülfidan, 1993: 94) 
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se, but saw the military regime between 1980 and 1983 as a way of regaining the 
political stability that had disappeared after 1977.  
Following the elections of 1983, the Motherland Party under the leadership 
of Turgut Özal, an ex-member of TÜSİAD and the architect of 24 January 
decisions, came into power. TÜSİAD welcomed the election of MP in 1983 and a 
return to the multiparty regime. Until 1989, TÜSİAD had good relations with the 
MP government. This can be explained by four factors. Firstly, the leader of MP, 
Turgut Özal, was a strong supporter of the dominance of the private sector in 
economy and the liberalization of economy. Indeed, he supported the private 
sector’s orientation towards exports by means of incentives provided by 
government and by the removal of restrictions on currency exchanges so that 
private sector could import without the control of state. Secondly, TÜSİAD had a 
place of its own in the Özal government since Özal was an ex-member of 
TÜSİAD. Thirdly, MP provided the political and economic stability that TÜSİAD 
demanded. Finally, Özal was a Western-oriented politician that had developed 
good relations with the IMF and had applied for full membership in 1987.  
As Gülfidan (1993: 98) notes that the absence of a common enemy that 
threats the private sector during the Özal era led to the divisions within TÜSİAD. 
Moreover, distribution of ‘rents’ based on personalized criteria challenged the 
power of TÜSİAD (Gulalp, 2001: 438). Thus, during the period between 1983 
and 1989, groups within TÜSİAD such as exporters, industrialists and importers 
sought for their interests, which challenged the power of the Association against 
the government (Öniş, 1992; Gülfidan, 1993).  
TÜSİAD’s relations with the MP government deteriorated in late 1980s. In 
1987, the ban on politicians such as Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit was 
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lifted by the referendum. Moreover, the votes of MP decreased. MP responded by 
completely liberalizing of economy on the one hand and introducing the populist 
policies on the other hand. Thus, the political parties’ tendency to apply populist 
policies in order to stay in government re-emerged. This contributed to the 
macroeconomic imbalances, caused by government’s inflationary policies 
implemented in order to sustain rapid economic development so that ruling parties 
could stay in power. Like the DP government, MP attempted to sustain rapid 
economic development by populist policies that increased public sector debt and 
exacerbated the macroeconomic imbalances. It could not resist the distributional 
pressures and turned to populism  (Atan, 2004: 106). This led to dissatisfaction of 
the big business (Öniş, 1991: 36)24. Moreover, as the support for MP wined as a 
result of worsening economic conditions, MP’s attitude towards its critics has 
sharpened. Indeed MP, like the DP, supported those who were ‘one of us’ but 
repressed the opposition. This was the case for TÜSİAD.  
Second factor that contributed to the deterioration of MP-TÜSİAD 
relations was the rise of new college-educated young businessmen. Atan notes 
that the domination of the younger generation coupled with the Europeanization 
of TÜSİAD by being member of the European business platforms has changed 
TÜSİAD’s stance in favor of the young generation leaders and led TÜSİAD to be 
more active on the political reform process  (Atan, 2004: 110). Moreover the 
number of people, educated in business sciences contributed to the expansion of 
large-scale firms (İlkin, 1993: 194).  
                                               
24
 According to Öniş(1991: 36), high inflation, which required frequent changes in nominal values 
of exchange rate and interest rates created uncertainties on the part of private sector and led to 
considerable alienation on the part of some private sector groups from the government’s economic 
programme during the Özal era.  
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This younger generation came into power by the election of Ömer 
Dinckok as TÜSİAD chairman. During the presidency of Dinckok, younger 
generation put more emphasis on politics. Second-generation TÜSİAD members 
did not feel the necessity to develop good relations with the national authorities as 
the first-generation TÜSİAD members who had got rich under the wings of the 
state feel. Moreover second-generation TÜSİAD members have been influenced 
by the western ideals such as the rule of market economy and more involvement 
of private sector in economic policy making. Thus, the criticisms of TÜSİAD 
against the government have been sharpened.  
Third factor is the rise of a new technocrat bureaucracy that was “imported 
from abroad” and “accountable directly to the Ministers or the Prime Minister” 
(Boratav et al, 1994: 65). The rise of such a bureaucracy, which contributed to the 
enforcement of the executive and its ability to act arbitrarily, resulted with 
exclusion of Turkish peak business from policy-making. Özal government, in its 
late years, did not pay attention to TÜSİAD’s demand for the formation of the 
Economic and Social Council. Indeed, Özal told TÜSİAD members “to mind their 
business”, “to sell their villas” or “to reduce the capacity of their companies” 
(Gülfidan, 1993: 102).  
 
3.4.3 1990 to Present 
 
In the 1990s, democratization and Turkey’s EU membership became the focal 
points of TÜSİAD (Öniş&Türem, 2002: 444; Öniş, 2001: 14). TÜSİAD has 
recognized that “the settlement of a market economy is not possible without a 
consolidated liberal democracy and a legal infrastructure accompanying it” 
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(Koyuncu, 2003: 165). Thus TÜSİAD realized the importance of politics to 
overcome the economic crisis and the capacity of the EU to force Turkey to 
accept accountable and transparent policy making. In line with this, TÜSİAD 
acted as a civil society organization that strove to promote the national interests of 
the country and argued for a liberal and democratic Turkey, which TÜSİAD 
assumed was a precondition for Turkey’s elevation to first rank in world affairs 
(Özbudun&Keyman, 2003: 306).  
The 1990s was characterized by coalition governments that continued to apply 
populist policies, which led to crises. Although coalition governments accepted 
the IMF packages on structural adjustment and the primacy of market economy in 
principle, they were not successful in implementation. There was a lack of 
political will to apply the IMF programs due to the governments’ populist 
tendencies. TÜSİAD was disturbed by macroeconomic imbalances that triggered 
three crises, in 1994, 1999 and 2001. TÜSİAD saw the lack of political will for 
the application of the IMF program as the main reason of the economic crisis 
(Konjonktur, April 2001: 1). It strongly favored the IMF recipes for restructuring 
Turkish economy and forced the government to apply these. However TÜSİAD 
realized two facts: that the IMF could act as a temporary anchor for restructuring 
Turkish economy, and that the political stability was precondition for economic 
crisis. Moreover, the economic crisis reinforced the political instability and 
contributed to the success of anti-European groups that led to deviations from the 
market economy and other Western values. TÜSİAD believed that 
democratization of state-society relations and active participation of the big 
business community could challenge these developments. Thus, TÜSİAD began 
to argue for the reforms that EU demanded from Turkey for full membership.  
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Serap Atan (2004) deals with the affects of social learning on the 
Europeanization of the peak business organizations in Turkey. She derives two 
hypotheses from the institutionalist approach: ‘actors are more open to learning 
and persuasion’; ‘radical and rapid transformations are likely… under special 
conditions characterized by crisis and external pressure’  (Atan, 2004: 109). Thus 
she argues that the business organizations that have been socialized by the 
European norms can appear as significant actors to challenge the governments’ 
policy agenda in 1990s that has been characterized by political and economic 
instabilities  (Atan, 2004: 109).  
Atan’s argument on the role of socialization in times of crisis fits the situation 
of Turkish business organizations. After the formal application of Turkey for the 
EU membership, both TOBB and TÜSİAD have become members of the Union 
of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE)  (Atan, 2004: 
104). Following UNICE membership, TÜSİAD adapted its internal structure to 
UNICE’s organizational scheme  (Atan, 2004: 105). Atan (2004: 108) notes that 
through joint action with the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC), Turkish 
business organizations became familiar with the ways in which European public 
and private actors interact at both the EU and the member state level. The 
socialization of the Turkish business organizations on interest representation in 
the EU was accelerated after the creation of the Economic and Social Council 
(ESC) (Atan, 2004: 108). ESCs, which were considered by the European 
Commission as the important institutional structures that can act as ‘crucial step in 
the integration of basic values and features of the European social model’ have 
attracted the attention of TÜSİAD  (Atan, 2004: 113). Social Affairs Committee 
of TÜSİAD prepared a report on TÜSİAD’s position on the ESC and defended its 
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right to participate in the national ESC on the ground that TÜSİAD is a member 
of UNICE  (Atan, 2004: 114). Despite the formation of ESC in 2001, the 
government holds the dominant position in the organization, which is a sign of 
traditional domination of the state over business organizations  (Atan, 2004: 109). 
Moreover, TÜSİAD is still not a member of ESC, but is expected to be a member 
(2005 Gündemi: 97).  
As Atan (2004: 109) says, the refusal of Turkey’s application for the EU 
membership due to the political questions such as democratization and human 
rights has attracted TÜSİAD’s interests to the political matters . Thus, TÜSİAD 
started to criticize the government for failing to grasp the close link between the 
liberal economy and the liberal regime. In this sense, the EU’s political demands 
from Turkey have led both the Turkish governments and TÜSİAD to shift their 
attentions from economic realm to the political realm 
 1990s also witnessed the rise of political Islam and the Kurdish problem. 
TÜSİAD reacted strongly against the Islamic parties and organized 
demonstrations against the Islamic Welfare party. TÜSİAD also supported the 28 
February 1997 memorandum that ended in the resignation of the leader of Welfare 
Party Necmettin Erbakan. TÜSİAD’s participation in the anti-WP protests and its 
support for the 28 February 1997 toppling of Erbakan from power seems to 
contradict its willingness to democratize the system and decrease the role of 
military. However TÜSİAD’s contradictory stance in favor of the military should 
be examined with reference to the role of the military in Turkey. As Cizre-
Sakallioglu underlines, the military in Turkey is committed to the Kemalist 
project of building a modern Turkish nation-state on secular and Western rather 
than Islamic principles; it acts as the ‘guardian of the flame of Kemalist regime’ 
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(Cizre. 1997: 154-155). Welfare Party followed an anti-Western policy, which 
was unacceptable for TÜSİAD. Thus TÜSİAD supported the undemocratic but 
exceptional counter pressure measure of military despite its general commitment 
to democratization.  
In this chapter we attempted to explain state-TÜSİAD relations, which is 
necessary in order to explain the origin of TÜSİAD’s pro-European attitude. We 
mainly showed that TÜSİAD was disturbed of by political instability and the 
undemocratic nature of state-society relations, which effectively excluded 
TÜSİAD from policy making and indirectly lead to economic crisis. The next 
chapter looks at TÜSİAD’s contribution to Turkish foreign policy towards EU.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
TÜSİAD ON EU 
 
 
In this chapter we will deal with the TÜSİAD’s attitude towards the EU. We 
will argue that TÜSİAD supports the EU for two reasons: firstly EU acts as an 
external anchor that can transform state-business relations in favor of the 
business; secondly EU membership can provide economic stability, which is hard 
to sustain in an age of globalization. Thus, TÜSİAD has supported full EU 
membership, even after the complete integration of the Turkish economy with the 
European market by means of the Customs Union. TÜSİAD’s pro-European 
activities accelerated after the Helsinki Council, which provided incentives for the 
formation of a pro-European coalition in Turkey and opened Turkey’s EU 
membership for debate by societal actors. Here, it should be mentioned that 
although the state elite in Turkey is committed to West, Europeanization of the 
Turkish political structure is not automatic, but contested by various actors. The 
evolutions of Turkey-EU relations and the signals that came from the EU have 
definitely shaped the direction of the debate. TÜSİAD has benefited from the 
positive signals provided by the EU in order ensure public support for the EU 
membership. TÜSİAD has countered both the nationalist rhetoric used by the 
 77 
 
Eurosceptics and the arguments against Turkey’s membership in European circles. 
The existence of circles that are against Turkey’s membership to the EU and 
TÜSİAD’s contributions to counter their arguments makes TÜSİAD an important 
subject to be investigated.  
 This chapter will deal with TÜSİAD’s perception of globalization, the EU 
and the ways used by TÜSİAD in order to achieve full membership for Turkey. 
Next, TÜSİAD’s contributions to Turkey’s relations with the EU will be dealt in a 
historical manner. Finally, the problems that weaken TÜSİAD’s contributions will 
be dealt.  
 
4.1. TUSIAD on Globalization 
 
Globalization is an important development that has increased the 
importance of Turkey’s EU membership for TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD perceives 
globalization as an irreversible and irresistible social fact that brings new set of 
relations such as emergence of new trade relations that compress geographical 
distances, the increasing importance of supranational relations that create new 
regulations beyond the nation-state and the fragmentation of domestic markets 
(Özbudun&Keyman, 2003: 304). According to TÜSİAD member Can Paker, 
globalization is a worldwide trend to which no power can reverse (Turkish Daily 
News, 11.29.2000). Paker argues for a new economic order wrought by the age of 
communication and globalization, in which there is a high level of competition 
among countries. Moreover, Paker points out the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which challenged strategic importance of Turkey and which, consequently, led to 
increasing importance of democracy and reduction of foreign assistance to 
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Turkey. Thus, he argues, Turkey has to interact and cooperate with other countries 
and must take rational economic steps.  
TÜSİAD believes that the globalization process led to two interrelated 
facts at the social level: cultural identity that takes the forms of Islam and Kurdish 
problem and the need to protect civil rights (Özbudun&Keyman, 2003: 304-306). 
To solve these problems, TÜSİAD argues for the democratic organization of 
state-society relations. For this, TÜSİAD asks the national authorities to solve the 
problems stemming from lack of democratization and political liberalism. In this 
sense, TÜSİAD perceives democratization of Turkey as the pre-condition for 
realization of economic interests brought by globalization. Paker says that Turkish 
authorities have to recognize the political values brought by globalization and the 
importance of individual vis a vis the state; otherwise, it cannot escape from 
marginalization (Turkish Daily News, 11.29.2000).  
 
4.2. TUSIAD on EU 
 
TÜSİAD’s perception of the EU is shaped by four factors: EU’s capacity 
to stabilize economic system in the age of globalization; EU’s capacity to 
guarantee a well-functioning economy and a liberal political system; material 
gains, such as FDI, brought by the EU membership; and the lessons derived from 
the economic crisis.  
Firstly, TÜSİAD perceives EU integration as increasing Turkey’s 
exposure to the globalizing world, which will determine the future of Turkey by 
advancing the level of both political modernization and economic development 
(Özbudun&Keyman, 2003: 305; Koyuncu&Keyman, 2005: 113-116). As Öniş 
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(2004) notes, “EU membership acts as the long-term anchor needed for the stable 
development of Turkish economy, given that the IMF was a temporary one” 
(Öniş, 2004: 17). Realizing the importance of the EU membership, President of 
the High Advisory Council Mustafa Koç argues that EU is Turkey’s most 
important peg for economic growth, prosperity and full integration with world 
markets (Cited by Karaca, 2004). Thus, future success of Turkish economy in the 
global world is tied to EU membership (Koyuncu, 2003: 173). 
According to Karaca, EU accession for business is the means of having 
access to European markets and creating more wealth and prosperity (Karaca, 
2004). It is a fact that the EU market presents enormous opportunities for Turkish 
firms; however this argument fails to consider the fact that Turkish market has 
been integrated to the European markets with the Customs Union. As Mustafa 
Koç states, Turkish economy is already integrated with the EU economy with 3 
million workers employed in the EU and 60 percent of exports to the EU (Cited 
by Karaca, 2004). Koç mentions the stability that will be brought by the EU 
membership is the reason for TÜSİAD’s pro-European stance. By using the term 
stability, TÜSİAD refers to the absence of political crises that lead to economic 
crises (TÜSİAD 2001 Çalışmaları: 56). For stability TÜSİAD proposes two 
things: reform of the state structure and public participation.  
Secondly, TÜSİAD believes that EU membership can act as an anchor to 
reform the state structure (TÜSİAD 2000 Çalışmaları: 7). According to Özilhan, 
EU is the opportunity to reform the clumsy and inefficient public order in which 
political institutions dominate the economic system and reduce market rationality 
(Görüş, November 2001: 6). For Özilhan, the reforms that Turkey should enact 
for EU membership intersect with the reforms that Turkey should adopt in order 
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to sustain a political and economic system that is less vulnerable to crises 
(TÜSİAD 2001 Çalışmaları: 56). In a similar vein, Kayhan explains EU’s 
transformative role with these words (Bülten, January-June 2002: 3): 
For us, working for European Union (membership) is to adopt the 
universal values accepted by EU, to sustain and work for primacy of law, 
freedom of expression, togetherness of different lives and opinions, 
transparent state to which public participation is guaranteed, efficient 
public order, decrease of regional differences and competitive market 
economy 
 
FDI is another reason for TÜSİAD’s pro-European attitude. TÜSİAD 
believes that EU membership of Turkey will contribute to an increase foreign 
direct investment in Turkey. According to Özilhan, foreign investment will allow 
Turkey to lessen inefficiency and unemployment (Görüş, July 2003: 6). He argues 
that EU membership is fundamental to increasing the foreign investment in 
Turkey, such as was the case in Spain (Görüş, July 2003). Özilhan also states that 
only the EU membership can bring stability to the economy, a hospitable 
investment environment and political tranquility that foreign investment seeks 
(Bülten, January-June 2002: 3).  
Final factor that effects TÜSİAD’s perception of the EU is about the 
lessons derived from the economic crisis, which dates back to 1979. During the 
1978 economic crisis, TÜSİAD got in touch with the IMF, World Bank, European 
Community and even NATO circles in order to bring economic stability 
(Gülfidan, 1993: 84). Şahap Kocatopcu notes that “EC represents not only 
economic but also political integration; if Turkey joins the EC she will not fear to 
be left alone in times of crisis” (Gülfidan, 1993: 84). Thus, TÜSİAD realized the 
importance of the EU for overcoming financial crisis.  
 
 
 81 
 
TÜSİAD, as the most active group in favor of the EU membership, 
counters the groups against Turkey’s membership both in Turkey and in the EU. 
To counter these voices in the EU against Turkey’s membership, TÜSİAD has 
started to draw attention to Turkey’s contributions to the EU. TÜSİAD states that 
Turkey-EU relations should be thought as positive-sum game that will bring 
benefits to both sides. After the European Council’s decision to start negotiations 
with Turkey, TÜSİAD’s Brussels Representation has prepared a brochure on the 
potential benefits of Turkish membership to EU and calling both EU and Turkish 
authorities to transform Turkey’s potential into assets for Europe.  
TÜSİAD has given importance to burnishing the image of Turkey in the EU. 
TÜSİAD engages in direct dialogue with the European politicians and bureaucrats 
for Turkey’s membership in the EU. Before the Copenhagen Council, TÜSİAD 
visited the European major centers for lobbying and participated in meetings with 
the European politicians such as Gerhard Schroder (Bülten, July-December 2002: 
11). As an extension of the visit, TÜSİAD also advertised in dailies of 15 
European states (Bülten, July-December 2002: 15). Moreover, to affect the 
policy-makers and the public opinion in Europe, TÜSİAD signed an agreement 
with Hill&Knowlton firm (2005 Gündemi: 119).  
TÜSİAD has opened an officer in Brussels in order to represent the 
Turkish business community at the EU level and within UNICE, to participate in 
UNICE expert working group meetings including US, WTO, enlargement, new 
economy, foreign trade, public procurement; to inform Turkish companies on the 
evolution of European affairs and to assist them in their projects and initiatives in 
the EU; and to provide the European and international public and private sector 
organizations with the accurate information and analysis on Turkey and to 
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contribute to the presentation of activities in Turkey (Newsletter January-June 
2004: p 13). Considering the importance of Germany in EU decision making, 
TÜSİAD opened a bureau in Berlin for lobbying on 1 May 2003 (Bülten, April-
June 2003, 15). On 1 December 2003, TÜSİAD opened another bureau in Paris 
(Bülten, April-June 2003, 15).  
TÜSİAD believes that the European business community could make 
important contributions for Turkey’s membership in the EU. With this belief, 
TÜSİAD has engaged in bilateral relations with its European counterparts to 
support Turkey’s full membership (Koyuncu, 2003: 154). TÜSİAD has demanded 
UNICE to support for Turkey’s full membership (TÜSİAD, 2002 Çalışmaları: 
22).  
TÜSİAD strongly opposes alternative options to Turkey’s full membership, 
such as privileged partnership. According to Kaleağası, these can only be 
considered as “neo-colonialist approach or as joke but in either case, it is not good 
for the credibility of EU to offer these kinds of indecent proposals” (Parliament 
Magazine, 13 December 2004: 66). He continues and says that Turkey is 
politically, institutionally, economically and culturally integrated to Europe and is 
a member of all the European platforms; there is no reason to think that Turkey is 
not European when it comes to full membership (Parliament Magazine, 13 
December 2004: 66). TÜSİAD opposes the measures taken by European 
governments that can endanger Turkey’s accession. For example TÜSİAD reacted 
amendment of the 88-7 article of French constitution by which Turkey’s EU 
membership will be put into referendum. For TÜSİAD, this was ‘discrimination 
against Turkey’ (2005 Gündemi: 27).  
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TÜSİAD is aware of the developments inside EU as well as deficits of the 
EU. Kaleağası says that the EU cannot reform the clumsy social state and remove 
the barriers on entrepreneurship due to the different dates of elections in member 
states and the populist politicians that prevent the total reform in EU (Zaman, 
January 2006). TÜSİAD also demands European business to be interested in the 
EU policies to overcome problems within the EU. For example TÜSİAD asked 
European businessmen to work together with the EU institutions and European 
governments in order to overcome the crisis that was a result of the rejection of 
the Agreement of European Constitution in France and Holland (2005 Gündemi: 
66)25.  
Through its pro-European activities, TÜSİAD also faces the domestic 
opposition of the Euro-skeptics which entirely reject the European project and the 
EU membership, called as ‘hard Euro-skepticism, or “qualified and contingent 
opposition which does not imply the rejection of membership itself” (Avcı, 2004: 
195-196). According to Avcı (2004: 197), the rise of the Euro-Skeptics is related 
with the nature of the accession to the EU. Since the fulfillment of the 
membership criteria leads to economic, political and social changes, and since the 
EU accession will generate losers as well as winners, discussion within Turkish 
politics becomes increasingly polarized.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
25
 TÜSİAD argues that by the referendum in France, will not affect Turkey’s membership, since 
the referendum cannot effect prior agreements (2005 Gündemi: 56-57). 
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Paker explains the conflict between TÜSİAD and the Eurosceptics as 
follows (Turkish Daily News, 29. 11. 2000): 
Capital in Turkey flourished under the wing of the state, but it has reached 
the point where the irrational behavior and expenditures of the state are not 
welcome to it. This irrational structure is nourished through credits that are 
withheld from capitalists and with taxpayers' money. It is evident that EU 
membership is to the advantage of TÜSİAD, whose future lays in a 
globalizing world. The other side is worried about its political future. This 
conflict is not between individuals; it is deep-seated and is likely to 
continue. It is obvious that capital will oppose a system where the state is 
in control of the economy to a large extent and cannot be called to account 
for its expenditures. This opposition has started a little belatedly, but it is 
only natural. 
 
TÜSİAD opposes the proposals from the anti-European coalition in 
Turkey to focus on developing relations with the Central Asian or Middle East 
countries and interprets these options as unrealistic proposals of the groups that 
benefit from the existing order. TÜSİAD draws attention to the potential benefits 
of the membership for Turkey. TÜSİAD argues that the failure of the reform 
process will result with an isolated and weak Turkey, facing security problem.  
 
4.3. TUSIAD on Democratization 
 
TÜSİAD’s insistence on democracy can be explained by three factors: 
democracy as a global norm; democracy to change state-business relations in 
favor of the latter; and, democracy to sustain political stability.  
Democracy and human rights for TÜSİAD are political values associated 
with globalization. Although TÜSİAD supported the 1980 military intervention, 
the association now calls for democratization of Turkey in accordance with the 
standards of Europe. According to Erkut Yucaoglu, TÜSİAD’s attempt for 
democratization is framed by globalization, which is a changing nature of world 
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economic and political affairs that made democracy not only a necessary but also 
sufficient condition for modernization and development (Cited by 
Keyman&Koyuncu, 2005: 113).   
In a similar vein, Öniş and Türem (2002: 440) draw attention to the 
linkage between democracy and globalization.  They note that political regimes 
cannot isolate themselves from the global norms in the age of globalization. 
Increasingly, democracy is considered as the counter-part of market-oriented 
reforms. Thus, failure to conform global norms, especially democracy, leads to 
isolation, insecurity and inability to capitalize on economic benefits, such as 
attracting FDI. Thus, business elites are aware of the negative consequences of 
failing to conform the global norms.  
Democracy for TÜSİAD is a way to ground liberal economy by which 
political and economic stability could be assured (Koyuncu, 2003: 183). TÜSİAD 
believes that political stability, which is pre-condition of economic stability, can 
only be achieved through social compromise and democracy (2005 Gündemi: 10). 
Democratization is also a means to check the state and make it more accountable 
and transparent (Öniş&Türem, 2002: 444). By this, TÜSİAD aimed to curtail 
redistributive powers of the state so that macroeconomic stability could be 
achieved.  
Democratization makes big business feel more secure in terms of property 
rights, legitimacy of its dominant status in society (Öniş and Türem, 2002: 442). 
According to Özilhan, Turkey should accept democracy and human rights, 
necessary institutional and structural reforms, development of non-governmental 
organizations and their participation in the administration (Newsletter January-
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June 2004: 1). For Özilhan it is wrong to perceive reforms on democracy as 
concessions towards the West (Hürriyet, 22. 01.2004).  
TÜSİAD has been supportive of EU demands on democratization and 
minority rights, especially the EU demands for the cultural rights of the Kurdish 
community in Turkey. However Koyuncu and Keyman (2005: 116) note that 
TÜSİAD values the rise of the Kurdish identity to the extent that it does not 
challenge the liberal pluralist democracy. Accordingly, TÜSİAD advocates a 
liberal model of citizenship that accepts the primacy of the individual rights over 
the cultural identity, acts according to the rule of law and express cultural identity 
in private sphere (Koyuncu&Keyman, 2005, 116.). Thus, TÜSİAD is against the 
politicization of the cultural identity or demands for recognition of identity. In the 
TÜSİAD report “Towards EU Membership: Political Reforms in Turkey”, 
TÜSİAD suggested the recognition of the cultural rights as individual rights rather 
than minority rights and asked the government to support the education of the 
traditionally spoken languages (AB Uyeligine Dogru: Türkiye’de Siyasi 
Reformlar, 2002: 26-28).  
TÜSİAD’s most important activity for promotion of democracy has been the 
preparation of the Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey. Through seminars 
and publications, TÜSİAD encouraged the public debate on sensitive issues that 
were dealt in the report  (Atan, 2004: 107). The report was prepared by Bulent 
Tanor, a respected academician, and was announced in December 1997. It was 
composed of three parts and dealt with the issues of human rights, political 
matters and rule of law. More importantly, it proposed for restructuring of the 
state-society and state-citizen relationships and proposed reform of the party 
system, altering the nature of civil-military relations and permitting the language 
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rights of the Kurdish minority (Öniş&Türem, 2002: 446). This was a radical 
departure from TÜSİAD’s tendency to seek good relations with the state elite at 
all costs.  
TÜSİAD was harshly criticized for the report both by the TÜSİAD members 
and by the public. First generation members of TÜSİAD whose economic power 
was dependent on the good relations with the Turkish state strongly reacted the 
proposals dealt in the report. The Eurosceptics, Turkish Armed Forces and the 
nationalist front has also reacted the report (Türkiye’de Demokratik Standartlarin 
Yukseltilmesi: Tartismalar ve Son Gelismeler; December 1999: 44-45). The 
report was found positive by the EU, liberal-democrats and even by the PKK. 
Despite the reactions and the strengthening of the Eurosceptics as a result of the 
Luxemburg Decision, TÜSİAD continued to emphasize on democratization with 
the seminars and publications to which politicians, businessmen and academicians 
participated.  
Continuation of the clientalistic relations coupled with the rent seeking 
behavior of Turkish businessmen has challenged the power of business 
organizations in Turkey. This was evident in the crisis of TÜSİAD after the 
declaration of the Democratization report in 1997. Especially the first generation 
of businessmen who knew that their success was dependent on continuation of 
good relations with the politicians and the bureaucrats opposed to confront with 
the Turkish state whereas second generation supported the report. Thus, although 
TÜSİAD went on to publish reports on democratization; its power has been 
weakened due to the opposition of some TÜSİAD members.  
Despite the constant emphasis on democratization, TÜSİAD also faces the 
problem of undemocratic decision-making. Decision-making in TÜSİAD is 
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limited to the member of directors or the advisory council. One TÜSİAD member 
explains the undemocratic situation in TÜSİAD as follows (Gülfidan, 1993: 53): 
Those influential in TÜSİAD are few in number… Rather than 
‘individual’ members, small number of ‘groups’ centered on certain families 
run the Association. Thus an ordinary member is admitted to TÜSİAD only if 
his or her views are in line with that of the Association. Those who hold 
contrary opinions cannot join TÜSİAD.  
 
Öniş and Türem (2002: 451-452) criticize the elite structure of the association 
that hinders democratic participation and democratic representation of the Turkish 
businessmen. The authors argue that, despite TÜSİAD’s claim to represent the 
Turkish business’ interests, TÜSİAD membership is composed of a few 
conglomerates. Moreover they point out TÜSİAD’s protests against the Welfare 
Party government in 1997, a party that has come to power as a result of 
democratic elections. During the anti-Welfare protests, TÜSİAD took part with 
the military, which contradicted with its emphasis on democratization. However 
this can be explained with the anti-European stance of Welfare party as well as 
TÜSİAD’s emphasis on secularism. Perceiving WP as a threat to integration with 
the EU, TÜSİAD supported the military’s position against the WP. Moreover, as 
Koyuncu and Keyman (2005) note, TÜSİAD is against the politicization of 
cultural identity. Finally, TÜSİAD might avoid confronting with the military. 
Although it proposes for civilization of the political scene and the curtailment of 
the political powers of the military, TÜSİAD is aware of the important position 
that Turkish army holds in determining political outcomes.  
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4.4. TUSIAD-EU Encounter 
 
This part will deal with the attitude of TUSIAD towards Turkey’s EU 
membership and TUSIAD’s contributions to Turkey-EU relations in a historical 
manner. This part will focus on two episodes: attitudes of TUSIAD towards the 
EU in the period between the promulgation of Customs Union agreement and the 
decision taken in the Helsinki Council concerning Turkey’s candidacy (1995-
1999); and the period after the Helsinki Council. These periods refer two 
significant changes in Turkey-EU relations: deterioration of the relations as a 
result of the Luxemburg Council decision to exclude Turkey from enlargement of 
the EU; and the recovery of the relations and the reform process after the Helsinki 
Council decision to grant Turkey the candidate status.  
 
4.4.1. TUSIAD before Helsinki 
 
TÜSİAD’s first priority in Turkey-EU relations has the Customs Union 
agreement. Three founders of TÜSİAD has stated that economic, social and 
cultural development could only be materialized by following the example of free 
world, along the lines of market economy principles and that the Turkish 
economy should be oriented towards achieving the planned Customs Union in 
1995 and EU (Gülfidan, 1993: 31).  
Atan  (2004: 109) notes that presentation of the Customs Union agreement 
as the last chance to guarantee membership by the Turkish government motivated 
TÜSİAD to focus on the ratification of the agreement. Therefore, TÜSİAD 
engaged in close relations with the European business community in gaining the 
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approval of the European Parliament for Turkey-EU Customs Union. TÜSİAD 
insisted that economic diplomacy should be set up as a means to shape external 
policies according to the national interests. According to Atan this was used to 
legitimize TÜSİAD’s engagement in Turkey-EU relations  (Atan, 2004: 109). 
Moreover TÜSİAD pressured on the government for fulfillment of the European 
demands on Turkey, mainly, the political demands. 
Despite TÜSİAD’s emphasis on the achievement of the Customs Union, 
TÜSİAD member companies in the automotive industry opposed the CU fearing 
that the Turkish market would be open to the European used cars (Elder, 2004: 
67; Uğur, 1999)26. Some of the support for the MP’s opposition to the CU came 
from these companies. In response to their objection, a 20-year exemption for 
used cars was granted. This was an example that Turkish businessmen, ignoring 
their voluntary organizations, might use patronage networks in order to sustain 
their particularistic interests. This challenges the reliability of TÜSİAD on 
Turkey’s accession to the EU.  
Luxemburg decision was another important point in shaping TÜSİAD’s 
attitude towards the European Union. Turkish government’s decision to suspend 
political dialogue with the EU was perceived by Turkish business as the start of 
de-Europeanization of Turkey, which meant isolation  (Atan, 2004: 107). 
Moreover the debates on the suspension of the Customs Union agreement and 
calls for looking for alternative markets have contributed to the threat of de-
Europeanization. Under this threat, TÜSİAD continued to strengthen its ties with 
the European counterparts. UNICE was used as the main mechanism to pressure 
the EU for Turkish membership. TÜSİAD asked the UNICE members to pressure 
                                               
26
 Paradoxically European and Japanese counterparts of these firms opposed complete 
liberalization of the automotive market in Turkey. (Elder, 2004: 67) 
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for Turkey’s membership before the Helsinki and the Copenhagen Councils. 
TÜSİAD has also continued dialogue with the European partners through use of 
Joint Consultative Committee. JCC has issued a common declaration in favor of 
strengthening of Turkey-EU relations  (Atan, 2004: 108).  
TÜSİAD’s pressure on the Turkish government has increased after the 
Luxemburg decision. TÜSİAD urged the governments to take necessary reforms 
for EU membership through direct contacts with the parliamentarians and the 
government, public announcements, public campaigns and publications. The 
report on the Democratization in Turkey was an important example of the public 
campaigns led by TÜSİAD.  
TÜSİAD has been always supportive of continuous dialogue in times of 
political crisis with the EU. TÜSİAD’s attitudes’ difference becomes clear when 
compared to other business associations. On Öcalan issue, TOBB and Ankara 
Trade chamber of trade sent letters to their counterparts in Italy and threatened to 
boycott the Italian goods, which would lead to the end of dialogue with the Italian 
counterparts (Sabah, 17.11.1998; Avcı&Hale, 2001: 37)27. On 18 November 
1998, the president of TOBB, Fuat Miras, called its members to ‘review’ their 
orders from Italy and to seek alternative markets for their imports (Sabah, 
18.11.1998). However TÜSİAD did not propose to boycott the Italian goods but 
chose to use the internal mechanisms of Italy and Europe (Sabah, 10.11.1998). On 
19 November 1998, TÜSİAD visited the Confindustria Italian Industrialists’ and 
                                               
27Abdullah Öcalan is the leader of the separatist PKK. In October 1998, Turkey pressured Syria to 
hand him over to Turkey. Öcalan fled to Moscow and then to Italy in November 1998 with the 
hope to be granted political asylum. Italian government did not send Öcalan back to Turkey. This 
has led to anti-Italian protests both among the governmental and societal actors such as putting an 
unofficial embargo on the Italian-made products and even burning them. In the face of the 
protests, the Italian government got rid of Öcalan in January 1999 instead of sending him back. In 
February 1999, Öcalan was captured in Nigeria, hiding in the Greek embassy 
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Businessmen’ Association and ‘documented the terror of PKK’ (Hürriyet, 
21.11.1998).  Vice President of the High Advisory Council of TÜSİAD Aldo 
Kaslowski asked Confindustria to pressure the Italian government in order to obey 
the bilateral agreements between Italy and Turkey. He also warned both Turkish 
and Italian media and the businessmen to avoid the deterioration of Turkey-Italian 
relations. TÜSİAD ex-chairman Kayhan enlarged the lobbying activities by 
carrying the Öcalan crisis to the European platforms and asked the members of 
UNICE to pressure Italy (Sabah, 4.12.1998). Rahmi Koç also demanded Koç 
Holding’s partner firm Fiat pressure the Italian government to return Öcalan back 
to Turkey (Sabah, 17.11.1998).  
TÜSİAD’s reaction to Greece’s support for Öcalan by hiding him in the 
embassy of Greece in Nigeria was harsher. The reason for this harsh attitude 
towards Greece can be explained by TÜSİAD’s attempt to remove the Greek veto 
on Turkey’s membership. TÜSİAD complained of Greece’s support for Öcalan to 
the UNICE. President of High Advisory Council Erkut Yucaoglu criticized 
Greece’s national hostility towards Turkey and stated that protesting Greece was 
the only chance for removing the Greek veto on the financial protocol of the 
Customs Union (Sabah, 27.02.1999). TÜSİAD has also supported the president of 
Greek-Turkish Business Council Rahmi Koç’s decision to resign from his position 
and to stop the activities of the organization (Radikal, 27.02.1999).  
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4.4.2. TUSIAD after Helsinki 
 
Approval of candidacy of Turkey for the EU membership in Helsinki 
Council was a turning point, both for Turkey-EU relations and for TÜSİAD’s pro-
European activities. Helsinki decision provided legitimacy for the pro-European 
coalition and gave TÜSİAD a chance a good opportunity to bring Turkey’s 
existing economic deficits into agenda (TÜSİAD, 2000 Çalışmaları: 7) 
Probably the period after the declaration of National Programme for the 
Adaptation of the Acquis (NAPP) has been TÜSİAD’s most fruitful one. In 
March 2001, EU Council approved the Accession Partnership and its financial 
framework, which underlined the criteria for full membership and demanded 
Turkey to comply with those criteria within a time schedule. As response to 
Accession Partnership, Turkish government prepared NAPP for the political, 
economic and legal reforms required for full membership. However the process of 
NAPP was not an undisputed one. Avcı (2004) notes that during the Nationalist 
Action Party (NAP)-MP-Democratic Left Party (DLP) coalition between 1999 
and 2002, NAP became an important obstacle in the progress for fulfillment of the 
NPAA.  NAP objected to the Cyprus’s bid to join the EU, abolishment of capital 
punishment, amendment of the article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, which bans 
the inciting of hatred on religious or ethnic groups, and the laws that allowed 
teaching, broadcasting and publication in Kurdish.  
Another counter voice came from the military circles. In March 2002, a 
time when the NPAA was disputed, the General Secretary of the National 
Security Council, General Tuncer Kılıç, put forward an alternative to Europe and 
said that (Sugden, 2004: 254): 
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Turkey definitely needs to be looking for new 
opportunities…Obviously in Russia and the USA, but also if possible with 
Iran. Turkey has not received the slightest help from the EU. The EU takes 
an antagonistic view on issues of importance to Turkey.  
 
Another development that forced TÜSİAD to increase pro-European 
activities is the decreasing public support for the EU membership. Although the 
public support for the EU membership reached its peak in November 2001, in 
2002, it had significantly fallen to about its 1998 level of 65 percent (Çarkoğlu, 
2004: 22-24). The main reason behind this decrease was the debate on the NAPP. 
As Çarkoğlu (2004: 24) states, public preferences were skeptical on the issues of 
uses of languages other than Turkish in education and broadcasting, and abolition 
of death penalty28. Çarkoğlu states two more reasons (Çarkoğlu, 2004: 24): 
Firstly, in February 2002, personal e-mail of European Commission 
Representative Karen Fogg was hacked; her private exchanges were manipulated 
in such a way as ‘to create an image of Fogg, and others who were in contact with 
her, as traitors who were on EU pay, working against Turkey’s national interests’. 
Secondly, the start of the bilateral talks on Cyprus was distorted in a way that the 
public was being exposed to novel views and information.  
In response to these developments, TÜSİAD published full-page 
advertisements in daily newspapers, reminding the government that ‘Turkey is at 
crossroads’ and called the government to facilitate the accession reforms. Next, 
TÜSİAD visited the General Staff Headquarters to deliver their message (Sugden, 
2004: 254).  
Decision of the Copenhagen Council of 2002 to start negotiations in 
January 2004 led TÜSİAD to focus on Turkey’s EU membership perspective in 
                                               
28
 Çarkoğlu’s study shows that a clear majority of Turkish public was against the Copenhagen 
adjustments. For more information on public responses on support for EU membership, see: 
Çarkoğlu, 2004.  
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2003. In order to force EU to decide on the start of negotiations with Turkey and 
to correct the image of Turkey in Europe, TÜSİAD opened bureaus in Berlin and 
Paris in 2003 (TÜSİAD 2003 Çalışmaları: 9). TÜSİAD also took the Lisbon 
Strategy of the EU into agenda with the belief of a parallelism with the reforms 
needed for Turkey and the Lisbon Strategy.  
TÜSİAD supported and lobbied for the start of negotiations. TÜSİAD 
argued that the start of the negotiation process would provide additional incentive 
for Turkey for accelerating integration (TÜSİAD, 2001 Çalışmaları: 56). Before 
the decision to start the negotiations, TÜSİAD declared that the Turkish business 
community was aware of the fact that negotiation process will take a long time, 
but it believes that Turkey is ready to start the accession negotiations 
(International Herald Tribune. 29.10.2004). During the negotiation process, 
TÜSİAD aimed to solve any problem that the membership perspective puts on the 
foreground of the agenda, transform Turkey’s potential into political, economic, 
cultural and security assets for future of EU, and watch and contribute to the EU’s 
evolution towards a globally competitive economy and institutionally efficient 
political entity (International Herald Tribune. 29.10.2004).  
 Despite TÜSİAD’s contributions, TÜSİAD was not still considered as a 
‘legitimate association’. This was evident on the debate on the representation of 
Turkish business through the negotiation period between TOBB and TÜSİAD. 
TÜSİAD demanded increased participation of private sector and the civil society 
to the negotiations process (2005 Gündemi: 5). For TÜSİAD, it has the right to be 
a part of the negotiations process since it is a member of UNICE and since 
TÜSİAD, with its experiences, can contribute to the negotiators (2005 Gündemi: 
8) Against TOBB’s argument to be the legal representative of Turkish business, 
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TÜSİAD opposed any hierarchical organization under the roof of TOBB (2005 
Gündemi: 69). In response, TOBB president Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu argued that, 
since TOBB is the legal representative of Turkish private sector, the ideas of 
TÜSİAD cannot bind anyone (2005 Gündemi: 70). Moreover, Hisarcıklıoğlu said 
that “all TÜSİAD members are also members of TOBB; thus it is me that will 
protect the rights of TÜSİAD members” (2005 Gündemi: 121).  
TÜSİAD was satisfied with the JDP’s attempt to democratize Turkey. 
Indeed TÜSİAD benefited from the JDP’s pro-European stance. However 
TÜSİAD’s relation with the JDP government is not an unproblematic one. 
TÜSİAD criticized the debates on issues such as head scarf, and argued that these 
debates deviate the real agenda of Turkey: EU-related reforms. Moreover, 
TÜSİAD, like the EU, criticized the aggressive stance of Turkish police towards 
the woman activists in 8 March demonstrations. However TÜSİAD’s criticism 
was harshly responded by Prime Minister Erdoğan.  Erdoğan (2005 Gündemi: 32) 
asked TÜSİAD ‘to take care of their own business’ and criticized chairman of 
TÜSİAD Ömer Sabancı with these words: 
The increase of the criticisms is not an accident. Tricks are being 
played. Someone has pushed the button. Businessmen should have 
common sense. But, for example look at the criticisms about the 8 March. 
Look at the speech of Ömer Sabancı. The murderers that killed his uncle 
are waiting over there, but he is giving speech as they want29 
 
In response, Sabancı accused Erdoğan to be intolerant to opposition, even 
from his party (2005 Gündemi: 46).   
Second debate between Erdoğan and TÜSİAD was on the arrest of the 
Rector of Van University. President of the High Advisory Council Mustafa Koç 
criticized Erdoğan for the arrest of the Rector. In response, Erdoğan called the 
                                               
29
 Fehriye Erdal, a terrorist, assassinated Özdemir Sabancı, uncle of Ömer Sabancı. After, she fled 
to Belgium. Turkish government demanded Belgium to return Erdal back to Turkey, but this was 
rejected.   
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public prosecutor to investigate the words of Koç (2005 Gündemi: 154). 
TÜSİAD, with the idea that the tension can damage the reform process, remained 
silent and overcame the problem with a meeting with Erdoğan. The words of a 
TÜSİAD member is the sign of the idea of strong state in the minds of Turkish 
business (2005 Gündemi: 161): 
At the last instance we all have business and we have to think of 
our business 
.  
These words indicated that TÜSİAD members fear that their ‘special 
relations’ with the government can be damaged if the crisis continues (2005 
Gündemi: 161). Indeed, these words point out the central weakness of Turkish 
business. Therefore, TÜSİAD members come into conflict with their general 
demand. TÜSİAD demanded democratization of state-society relations so that 
political and economic stability could be sustained. However TÜSİAD members 
do not want to lose their privileged situation and benefits sustained by patronage 
networks. This indicates a paradox that questions its reliability. As Uğur (1999: 
88) notes, TÜSİAD wants to hold its privileged situation but accuses the 
government for all economic crisis. However patronage networks constitute a 
fundamental reason of economic crisis. This diminishes the reliability of 
TÜSİAD, both in the eyes of the governing elites and the public. That is, if 
TÜSİAD members keep their rent-seeking behavior, this will challenge the 
legitimacy of their demands as well as their position.  
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4.5. TUSIAD on Cyprus 
 
TÜSİAD’s concern on the Cyprus Issue is related to the EU demands for 
the settlement of the dispute. Realizing that the Cyprus problem will constitute an 
obstacle for Turkey’s membership, TÜSİAD has focused on Cyprus (Koyuncu, 
2003).  
TÜSİAD has been supportive on the EU’s demands on the Cyprus. 
TÜSİAD proposed for the solution of the Cyprus problem in line with the UN 
General Secretary plan. While countering the anti-European coalition, TÜSİAD 
has benefited from the JDP’s active stance on the EU issue and its ability to move 
beyond the nationalist rhetoric on Cyprus (Öniş, 2004: 17; Avcı, 2004: 208)30.  
For the settlement of the dispute TÜSİAD has developed direct relations 
with the Greek Cypriot government. TÜSİAD mission under the leadership of 
Ömer Sabancı came together with its counter part OEB (Greek Cypriot 
Employees and Industrialists Federation) and stated that they said yes to trade 
with the Greek Cypriot administration (Hürriyet, 13.10.2004). TÜSİAD also 
demanded the EU to force and inculcate the Greek administration (Bülten, 
January-June 2002: 4). However TÜSİAD also considers the difficulties of the 
Northern Cypriot Businessmen. In a visit to for lobbying for the start of 
negotiations after the Copenhagen Council of 2002, Northern Cyprus 
Businessmen Association president Ozdil Nami was called to the TÜSİAD 
mission (Sabah, 12.11.2002). 
                                               
30
 The leader of JDP, Tayyip Erdoğan, was in favor of the settlement of the Cyprus dispute through 
compromises from both sides. In line with this, he took the Cyprus issue to the public sphere and 
created a national debate on the Cyprus problem. Thus, he opened the traditional stance of Turkey, 
which was in favor of the protection of the status quo in Cyprus, into debate.  
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Before the referendum on the UN General Secretary Plan, known as 
Annan Plan, TÜSİAD has prepared a radio programme with the aim of 
enlightening the Turkish-Cypriot public on the EU (Bülten, April-June 2004: 6).  
TÜSİAD also faced the criticisms of the anti-European coalition and was 
accused as ‘traitorous’. TÜSİAD strongly reacted to the accusation of the 
supporters of the UN solution on the Cyprus as ‘traitorous’. Özilhan called the 
Cyprus problem as ‘gangrene’ and asked for respect to solve such a problem 
(Hürriyet, 22. 01.2004). He said that it is disrespectful to democracy to accuse the 
supporters of solution on Cyprus. For TÜSİAD, supporting the status quo meant 
continuation of the isolation of Northern Cyprus (2005 Gündemi: 147). 
TÜSİAD’s lobbying activities did not succeed; UN was rejected by the 
referendum. After the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek-Cypriot side, 
TÜSİAD demanded the European Parliament to hold their promises to Turkey 
(2005 Gündemi: 14).  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This work attempted to focus on the affects of the strong state tradition over the 
activities of non-governmental organizations with special emphasis on the case of 
TÜSİAD. Three main questions were asked: Why does TÜSİAD demands 
Turkey’s full membership to the EU; how did TÜSİAD contribute to this, and, 
what are the affects of the strong state tradition on the role of TÜSİAD in foreign 
policy.  
It has been mainly argued that Turkish peak business has been negatively 
affected by the Ottoman-Turkish political culture in two senses: firstly, 
businessmen could not evolve into autonomous powers whose social existence was 
guaranteed; and secondly TÜSİAD members have been negatively affected by the 
political instability which resulted with economic crisis.  
Turkish Republic has inherited a strong state tradition from the Ottoman 
Empire. Accordingly, the absence of powerful autonomous groups led to the rise of 
a situation in which the private sector developed under the wings of the state. In 
addition to this, Turkish political culture had the understanding of patrimonial state 
in which the state’s duty was to protect the order and to sustain welfare of its 
citizens. These two facts reinforced each other: the absence of intermediary bodies 
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led to the absence of an individualist political culture which resulted with the 
legitimacy problem of entrepreneurial activity whereas the patrimonial state 
understanding and the primacy given to the collectivity prevented the rise of a 
powerful and autonomous private sector. This resulted with the primacy of 
political power over the economic power. Although Turkish firms were supported 
by the state in order to maintain rapid industrialization, their participation to the 
political realm in an institutionalized manner was viewed with suspicion.  
However politicization of Turkish businessmen was unavoidable. As a result of 
high degree of government centralization and the large role of Turkish state in the 
economy in the pre-liberalization period, the governing parties controlled a vast 
amount of resource. This resource base could be easily utilized to attract votes; the 
parties in government could exchange resources with votes and could sustain their 
governance. Consequently, the parties that were not in the government got 
weakened, since they did not have access to patronage resources. This made the 
competing parties vulnerable to the demands of the electorates. It led to the 
attempts of governing parties to sustain broad-based coalitions, which resulted with 
macroeconomic instability, increasing public debts and high inflation rates. In this 
sense, strong state coexisted with weak governments.    
In such an environment, it was inevitable for Turkish businessmen to get 
involved in politics. Since it was the state that controlled import allocation quotas 
and foreign exchange resources, which constituted two critical resources for the 
business during the ISI period, Turkish entrepreneurs had to develop good relations 
with the governing parties. Moreover since the state had supplied indirect 
resources, such as tax exemptions, negative interest rates and cheap credits, being a 
part of the patronage network for Turkish business became a target.  
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The state tradition had three consequences for Turkish business. Firstly 
particularistic interests of the business, which is a natural phenomenon in the 
market economy, is seen as illegitimate both in the eyes of the national authorities 
and the public. Secondly, representation of the business’s interests through the 
formal institutions was insufficient, which led peak business to develop alternative 
ways of assuring their interests, such as the patronage networks or voluntary 
associations. Finally, the economic instability coupled with the protection of 
private sector through etatist policies resulted rent-seeking behavior of 
businessmen.   
 Although economic dependence of Turkish business to the state has decreased 
in the post-liberalization period, Turkish businessmen still face with the problems 
created by the strong state tradition and its consequences. Firstly, the continuation 
of the populist policies resulted with three economic crises in 1994, 1999 and 
2001, of which the first and the second ones were directly related with huge public 
debts as a result of populist policies in the 1990s. Secondly, these crises showed 
the negative affects of globalization. That is, in the age of globalization, the FDI 
could easily move from one place to another unless political stability, which is a 
pre-condition of economic stability, could be assured. Moreover, the key to attract 
the FDI was to guarantee a liberal political and economic order. In other words, 
failing to conform the global norms had heavy costs both for Turkey and Turkish 
business.  
In the case of the EU, it was evident that the EU could assure stable markets. 
Moreover EU-related reforms had the capacity to force the Turkish governments to 
maintain a liberal political and economic order, which would minimize the 
negative affects of globalization. Given the weakness of Turkish non-governmental 
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actors on forcing the governments for these reforms, and the temporality of the 
IMF agreements, EU could act as an external anchor to avoid political and 
economic instability and to transform Turkey’s existing political structure that is 
shaped by the strong state tradition.  
TÜSİAD’s involvement in Turkey-EU relations should be investigated by 
taking these into consideration. TÜSİAD is the organization of the Turkish peak 
business that is formed voluntarily in 1971. It acts as a non-governmental 
organization with the aim of sustaining a liberal political and economic order that 
is needed in order to sustain the development of private sector and to guarantee its 
existence in Turkish society.  
There is no doubt that the integration of Turkish economy into the global 
economy through the liberalization and the Customs Union agreement has changed 
the behavioral patterns of member companies of TÜSİAD. For example the 
number of professional managers have increased in large holdings. Moreover big 
business’ dependence on the state for foreign exchange has ended as the member 
companies oriented towards exports and finance. Indeed, they have become 
important lenders to the state. However, these did not result with a complete 
transformation of the habits of Turkish peak business: Holdings are still run by the 
family members; Turkish businessmen still lack entrepreneurial spirit; they still 
give importance to develop good relations with the governments; they have the 
rent-seeking attitude, and they still try to avoid serious confrontations with the 
governments. 
TÜSİAD has evolved though time. 1970s have been the years that TÜSİAD 
aimed to legitimize the social legitimacy of the entrepreneurship against the rising 
left. In addition to this, TÜSİAD members, who were predominantly industrialists, 
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were unsatisfied with TOBB in which the interests of conglomerates and the 
industrialists were underrepresented. Until 1979 when TÜSİAD member firms 
faced with the shortage of foreign exchange, TÜSİAD did not have a significant 
influence on governments  
Until late 1980s, TÜSİAD proposed for economic solutions and demanded 
more roles in participating in policy-making. TÜSİAD has remained silent during 
the Özal era due to the absence of a common enemy. Moreover the patronage 
politics undermined the possibility of collective action during the 1980s.  
After the rejection of Turkey’s application, mainly due to political 
considerations, TÜSİAD shifted its emphasis on democratization and foreign 
policy, with a special focus on the EU.  TÜSİAD urged the governments to take 
necessary reforms for EU membership through direct contacts with the 
parliamentarians and the government, public announcements, public campaigns 
and publications.  
Another characteristic of TÜSİAD is its insistence on continuous dialogue 
with the EU in times of crises. As in the case of Ocalan crisis, TÜSİAD made use 
of the internal mechanisms of the EU rather than suspending relations.  
Our findings indicate three reasons for TÜSİAD’s support for democratization: 
TÜSİAD have realized the importance of democracy for sustaining political and 
economic stability. Liberalization of economy in Turkey was not accompanied by 
a liberal political order. Moreover, the state did not retreat from the economic 
realm. Thus, the continuation of populist policies resulted with high level of 
inflation and interest rates and increasing public debt, leading to macroeconomic 
instability. The situation worsened during the coalition governments in 1990s that 
led to three economic crises. Thus TÜSİAD became aware of the fact that the 
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government should be accountable and decision-making should be transparent so 
that populism and economic instability could be prevented. This led TÜSİAD to 
raise concern on democratization.  
Democratization was also important for TÜSİAD in order to guarantee 
property rights of the peak business as well as to institutionalize its existence in the 
society. Given that their positions depend on their loyalty to the governing parties, 
Turkish businessmen feel themselves insecure. Thus, the establishment of a liberal 
democracy, which is the only way to protect the social position and property rights 
of Turkish businessmen, was advocated by TÜSİAD.  
Another point that increased the importance of a liberal order was the 
globalization. TÜSİAD members are aware of the high costs for failing to conform 
to the global norms. For TÜSİAD, democracy means integration to the world 
economy whereas authoritarianism means isolation and continuous economic 
crisis. Thus, TÜSİAD proposes for democratization reforms.  
TÜSİAD’s pro-European attitude is closely related to TÜSİAD’s perception of 
democracy.  EU for TÜSİAD is an external anchor that can stabilize Turkish 
political and economic structure through pushing for democratization reforms. 
However TÜSİAD is also aware of the fact that the EU’s influence on Turkey can 
continue as long as membership is guaranteed. Due to this, TÜSİAD lobbies for 
Turkey’s membership abroad, and tries to challenge the anti-European groups at 
home. TÜSİAD tries to create public support for Turkey’s membership both in 
Turkey and abroad. Indeed, it is the rise of the public support for the anti-European 
groups that made TÜSİAD important. As the debates on sensitive issues increased 
during the reform process, the anti-European groups used these issues for 
manipulating the public against the reforms, and even the EU. In addition to these, 
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the debates on Turkey’s membership had also risen in the EU circles. At his point, 
TÜSİAD played an important role for the constitutional reforms in line with the 
Copenhagen Criteria in 2002. TÜSİAD’s lobbying activities has also been 
successful in forcing the EU on the decision to start the negotiations with Turkey 
in 2005.  
Second importance of the EU comes from its relation with the globalization. 
Perceiving globalization as an irreversible process, TÜSİAD argues for Turkey’s 
membership to the EU so that negative consequences of globalization and 
macroeconomic stability can be prevented. Moreover TÜSİAD argues that 
Turkey’s EU membership will increase FDI to Turkey since EU-related reforms 
conform to the global norms. Additionally, TÜSİAD takes the EU market as a 
stable and large one that Turkish peak business can exploit.  
Despite its constant emphasis on democracy and other liberal norms, TÜSİAD 
may be undemocratic at some points. The elitist structure of the organization with 
small number of members contradicts with TÜSİAD’s claim to represent the 
Turkish private sector. Moreover domination of TÜSİAD by certain families 
prevents democratic policy-making inside TÜSİAD. Finally TÜSİAD’s reliability 
on the issue of democratization is a problematic one; as noted earlier, TÜSİAD 
may prefer stability to democracy if stability and democracy cannot co-exist.  
However the major problem that prevents TÜSİAD to become a powerful 
pressure group, influencing foreign-policy making is the state tradition. Still, 
TÜSİAD is not a member of the ESC, the organization that TÜSİAD proposed. 
Moreover, since TÜSİAD members are compulsory members of the TOBB, there 
rises debate on the right to represent Turkish private sector. TÜSİAD is not 
considered as a legitimate representative of Turkish business; when confrontation 
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with the government appears, TÜSİAD is advised to take care of their own 
business rather than politics. Paradoxically, TÜSİAD members, leading to the loss 
of coherence policy-making, criticize confrontation of TÜSİAD with the governing 
parties.  
Another important point that challenges the power of TÜSİAD is the patronage 
networks. Despite TÜSİAD’s emphasis on preventing economic instability, 
TÜSİAD members continue to be a part of patronage networks; they still seek for 
rent. Thus TÜSİAD members contradict with their own demands. This decreases 
the reliability of TÜSİAD and stimulates the already-existing prejudice towards 
peak business.  
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